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Abstract
This paper examines the market-wide eﬀects of front-running and information-sharing by
dealers in a quantitive microstructure model of Forex trading. Recent investigations by gov-
ernment regulators and court proceedings reveal that there has been widespread sharing of
information among Forex dealers working at major banks, as well as the regular front-running
of large customer orders. I use the model to study the eﬀects of unilateral front-running, where
individual dealers trade ahead of their own customer orders; and collusive front-running where
individual dealers trade ahead of another dealer’s customer order based on information that was
shared among a group of dealers. I find that both forms of front-running create an information
externality that significantly aﬀects order flows and Forex prices by slowing down the process
through which inter-dealer trading aggregates information from across the market. Font-running
reduces dealers’ liquidity provision costs by raising the price customers pay to purchase Forex,
and lowering the price they receive when selling Forex. These cost reductions are substantial;
they lower costs by more than 90 percent. Front-running also aﬀects other market participants
that are not directly involved in front-running trades. The information externality makes these
participants less willing to speculate on their private information when trading with dealers.
This indirect eﬀect of front-running can reduce participants’ expected returns by as much as 10
percent. My analysis also shows that collusive front-running has larger eﬀects on order flows
than unilateral front-running because information-sharing reduces the risks dealers face when
trading ahead of customer orders. However, in other respects, the eﬀects of collusive and uni-
lateral front-running are quite similar. Greater collusion lowers the costs of providing liquidity
and it reduces other participants’ expected returns, but the eﬀects are small.
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Introduction
Foreign currency (Forex) trading appears to take place in a highly competitive environment. Since
the mid-1990s, major currencies have traded almost continuously between large numbers of counter-
parties on multiple electronic platforms in high volumes and with very tight bid-ask spreads. How-
ever, in recent years, government regulators and enforcement authorities across the globe undertook
investigations into whether many of the world’s largest dealer-banks were acting anti-competitively
in the Forex market. Between 2014 and 2015 reports issued by the U.S. Department of Justice, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, New York Department of Financial Services, the U.K.
Financial Conduct Authority, and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority all concluded
that dealer-banks engaged in a range of collusive conduct aimed at manipulating the Forex bench-
marks, specifically the ECB and WMR Fixes.1 The investigators also found that the dealer-banks
had engaged in other forms of anticompetitive conduct, including the collusive sharing of informa-
tion and front-running. Following these reports, the U.S Department of Justice and the Federal
Reserve Board indicted and placed lifetime bans on more than a dozen individual FX dealers and
in 2017 a dealer was convicted of wire fraud for his part in a scheme to front-run a $3.5 billion
trade.2 In addition, multiple law-suites have been brought before the courts in the United States
and Canada alleging that dealer-banks engaged in anti-competitive behavior that harmed investors.
By the end of 2018, these investigations and law-suites produced fines and settlements totaling over
$11 billion.
This paper examines how the anti-competitive behavior identified by government regulators
and enforcement authorities aﬀects the spot Forex market. In particular, I use a quantitative
microstructure model to analyze how the collusive sharing of information and front-running by
dealer-banks impacts the behavior of Forex prices, trading flows and the welfare of all market
participants. According to the investigations and court proceedings, there has been wide-spread
information-sharing among dealer-banks concerning their inventory positions and pending customer
Forex orders (i.e., orders from non-dealers). I use the model to examine how such information-
1Information on these investigations can be found at: DOJ Press Release, Five Major Banks Agree
to Parent Level Guilty Pleas (May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-
level-guilty-pleas. CFTC Press Release No. 7056-14, CFTC Orders Five Banks to Pay over $1.4 Bil-
lion in Penalties for Attempted Manipulation of Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7056-14. DFS Press Release, NYDFS Announces Barclays to
Pay $2.4 Billion, Terminate Employees for Conspiring to Manipulate Spot FX Trading Market (May 20, 2015),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1505201.htm. FCA Press Release, FCA fines five banks 1.1 billion for FX fail-
ings and announces industry-wide remediation program (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-five-
banks-for-fx-failings. FINMA Press Release, FINMA sanctions foreign exchange manipulation at UBS (Nov. 12,
2014), http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/pages/mm-ubs-devisenhandel-20141112.aspx.
2See, U.S. v. Johnson, No. 16-cr-457-NCG-1 (E.D.N.Y.).
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sharing aﬀects trading across the market. The investigations also revealed that the dealer-banks
regularly front-run large customer orders. In this practice, a dealer establishes a speculative position
before executing the customer’s order so as to profit from its eﬀect on prices. For example, a dealer
will buy Forex before executing a large Forex purchase on behalf of a customer with the aim of
making a capital gain from the rise in prices produced by the execution of the large purchase. I use
the model to study the eﬀects of unilateral front-running, where individual dealers “trade ahead”
of their own customer orders; and collusive front-running where individual dealers trade ahead of
another dealer’s pending customer order based on information that was shared among a group of
dealers.
The model I develop extends earlier multiple-dealer models of Forex trading in Lyons (1997),
Evans and Lyons (2002) and Evans (2011). The model describes trading between a large num-
ber of dealer-banks (hereafter dealers), and two groups of customers called investors and hedgers.
Trading takes place between dealers in the wholesale tier of the market, and between dealers and
their customers in the retail tier. Dealers are risk-averse and choose their trades and price-quotes
optimally in both tiers of the market. Investors are also risk averse and optimally determine the
orders they place with dealers in the retail tier. In contrast, dealers receive orders from hedgers that
are determined by an exogenous liquidity factor. The model provides a rich environment to study
the market-wide eﬀects of information-sharing and front-running. In particular, I analyze how the
equilibrium behavior of prices and trading flows change when dealers share information about their
customer orders, and when they front-run hedgers’ orders, both unilaterally and collusively.
My analysis produces several noteworthy findings:
1. In the absence of front-running, the sharing of customer-order information among dealers
increases the volatility of aggregate inter-dealer order flows but has little impact on equilibrium
prices or the welfare of dealers and investors.
2. Risk-averse dealers have a strong incentive to unilaterally front-run their own customer orders,
even when the execution of those orders has no impact on prices.
3. In an equilibrium where dealers have the opportunity to front-run their own customer orders,
trading ahead of those orders creates an information externality that has significant eﬀects on
trading flows and prices. The externality slows down the process by which inter-dealer trading
aggregates the information that is ultimately embedded into the prices, which in turn aﬀects
the trading decisions of both dealers and investors.
4. Front-running reduces the costs dealers incur from providing liquidity to hedgers. It raises the
price hedgers pay when they are net purchasers of Forex, and reduces the price they receive
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they are net sellers of Forex. These eﬀects are substantial. They reduce dealers’ costs of
providing liquidity by more than 90 percent.
5. Front-running also aﬀects the welfare of dealers and investors. The information externality
makes risk-averse investors less willing to speculate on their private information when trading
with dealers, so they make smaller trading profits when that information becomes embedded
in future prices. This indirect eﬀect of front-running can reduce investors’ expected returns
by as much as 10 percent. The reduction in investors’ trading profits also benefits dealers,
accounting for approximately half of the reduction in the total costs of providing liquidity
across the market.
6. Collusive front-running has larger eﬀects on aggregate inter-dealer order flows than unilateral
front-running because information-sharing reduces the risks dealers face when trading ahead
of customer orders. In other respects, the eﬀects of collusive and unilateral front-running are
quite similar. Greater collusion lowers the costs of providing liquidity to customers, and it
reduces investors trading profits, but the eﬀects are small.
It is worth emphasizing that these results address the impact of information-sharing and front-
running across the entire market. In particular, my analysis looks beyond the direct impact of shared
information or front-running by individual dealers to consider their equilibrium eﬀects on the trading
decisions of other dealers and investors. This perspective counters the widespread assumption that
the eﬀects of front-running are not market-wide (Kyle and Viswanathan, 2008). It is also empirically
important because even though dealer information-sharing and front-running appear to have been
widespread, it is unlikely to have directly involved more than a small fraction of all trades in the
market. In my analysis, dealers do not front-run investors’ trades or share information about those
trades, so the impact of information-sharing and front-running on investors occurs indirectly via
changes in the behavior of equilibrium prices. In this sense, the fall in investors’ returns represents
collateral damage from dealer front-running.
The model shows that front-running by individual dealers has a market-wide impact because it
creates an externality that aﬀects how the information contained in external Forex orders becomes
embedded in the prices dealers quote. In the absence of front-running, dealers trade in the wholesale
tier to replenish their inventories after filling investor orders from earlier in the day. As in other
models (e.g., Lyons, 1997, and Evans, 2011), the aggregate order flow produced by this inter-dealer
trading contains information on the market-wide imbalance in investors’ orders, which dealers then
use to revise their price quotes. Front-running disrupts this process. When individual dealers learn
about their future orders from hedgers, the information becomes an additional factor determining
the trades they initiate with other dealers. This means that the aggregate order flow produced by
3
inter-dealer trading now contains information on the imbalance in past external orders from investors
and future orders from hedgers. Because dealers draw inferences from order flow about the price
they should quote to share risk eﬃciently across the market, when the information conveyed by
order flow changes, so too do dealer’s inferences and the prices they quote based on a given order
flow. Thus, front-running aﬀects the determinants of aggregate order flow and its price-impact.
These equilibrium eﬀects feedback on dealers’ decisions to front-run in the wholesale tier, and they
aﬀect how investors trade in the retail tier.
This paper contributes to the literature on the manipulation of securities prices; originating
with Hart (1977), Vila (1989), and Allen and Gale (1992). Its closest antecedents in that literature
appear in the work on dual and predatory trading.3 Rochet and Vila (1994) examine a static dual
trader model in which a monopolist trades on his own account and processes all the liquidity trades
from retail customers. They show that the equilibrium does not depend on whether the monopolist
sees the liquidity trades because the price-impact of order flow endogenously adjusts to changes in
the monopolists’ information. This irrelevance result counters the widespread intuition that dual
trading must harm liquidity traders, as a monopolist will exploit information about liquidity trades
that drive prices away from true asset values. However, the irrelevance result breaks down in a
dynamic setting. Bernhardt and Taub (2008) show that a monopolist with knowledge of current
and future liquidity trades can gain by front-running future liquidity trades. Predatory trading
models examine situations where some traders become aware of another trader’s need to liquidate a
position. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), so-called predator traders sell ahead of or alongside
the liquidating trader, before reversing their positions. Bessembinder et al. (2016) examine how
this particular type of strategic trading depends on the price-impact of trades and on competition
between the predators (see, also: Admati and Pfleiderer, 1991, Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan,
2007, and Schied and Schöneborn, 2009). My analysis contains elements of both the dual and
predatory theories. Forex dealers act as dual traders insofar as they fill the external orders from
customers in the retail tier and initiate trades with other dealers in the wholesale tier of the market.
Dealers also could be viewed as engaging in predatory trading when they use the information on
the pending external orders they receive from hedgers to trade strategically in the wholesale tier.
This paper is also related to research on Forex benchmarks, such as the WMR and ECB Fixes.
Melvin and Prins (2015) drew attention to the fact that global portfolio managers have a strong
3Models of security price manipulation cover a wide range of topics; including manipulation in futures via corners
and squeezes (see, e.g., Kumar and Seppi, 1992) and the manipulation of closing equity prices (see, e.g., Cushing and
Madhavan, 2000, Hillion and Suominen, 2004, and Comerton-Forde and Putnignvs, 2011), but these models have
limited applicability to Forex market. Manipulation via corners and squeezes is impractical for major currencies,
while pump-and-dump schemes requiring the release of credible but false information that moves Forex prices are
implausible. Evans (2018) discusses the diﬀerences between the manipulation of closing equity prices and Forex
benchmarks.
4
hedging incentive to submit orders that execute at the Fix price, particularly at the end of each
month. According to the reports issued by government regulators, transcripts from electronic chat-
rooms show that a number of dealers collusively front-ran the Fix orders they received from portfolio
managers and others. In Evans (2018), I found that Forex prices were unusually volatile around
WMR 4:00 pm Fix, and that Forex returns were negatively correlated either side of 4:00 pm (see, also
Ito and Yamada, 2015). Furthermore, these empirical findings were inconsistent with a competitive
model of Fix trading. In that model, dealers do not front-run their Fix orders because the associated
gain is oﬀset by an endogenous change in the composition of the orders. In this paper, dealers
can distinguish between customers who have price-insensitive reasons for trading (i.e., hedgers)
and price-sensitive reasons (i.e., investors), and can front-run the price-insensitive orders. The
front-running of selected customer orders is consistent with the evidence provided by government
regulators and trial testimony. Osler and Turnbull (2017) also study dealer trading around the
Fix in a model where trades are assumed to have a permanent price-impact that is proportional
to the size of order flow. They emphasize that dealers trade strategically; front-running their own
Fix orders and anticipating how the front-running by other dealers aﬀects prices. Strategic trading
also plays an important role in my model because it determines how aggregate order flows convey
information that dealers use to quote prices. Unlike Osler and Turnbull (2017) and other strategic
trading models, the price-impact of trade is determined endogenously in my model from dealers’
optimal quotes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the model. The next
section examines the equilibrium where dealers have no opportunity to share information about or
front-run their customer orders. This serves as a benchmark for the rest of the analysis. Section
3 introduces front-running. I first examine why dealers have an incentive to unilaterally front-
run their own customer orders in the benchmark equilibrium. Next, I analyze the equilibrium
eﬀects of unilateral front-running by all dealers. Section 4 considers the eﬀects of collusive front-
running where dealers share information about pending external orders. Section 5 examines how
information-sharing and front-running aﬀect dealers’ and investors’ welfare. Section 6 concludes.
1 The Benchmark Model
I study the eﬀects of dealer collusion and front-running in a standard microstructure model of OTC
Forex trading. The overall structure of the model extends Evans (2011) with an additional round
of trading and the inclusion of two types of Forex customers. This section presents the benchmark
version of the model in which collusion and front-running are absent. In the following sections, I
introduce dealer front-running and collusion and study how these activities aﬀect the equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Benchmark Model Timing
				Round	I	 	 Payoff	shock	realized:	!"	Investors’	income	realized:	#"$	Dealers	quote	prices:	%":'( 	Investors	place	orders:	)":'$ 	Dealers	fill	investors’	orders		 	 	Round	II	 	 Dealers	quote	prices:	%":''( 	Dealers	initiate	inter-dealer	trades:	*":''( 	Dealers	fill	inter-dealer	orders:	+":''( 	Dealers	observe	aggregate	order	flow:	,":'' 		 	 	Round	III	 	 Dealers	quote	prices:	%":'''( 	Investors	and	hedgers	place	orders:	)":'''$ 	and	ℍ"/	Inter-dealer	trade:	*":'''( ,	+":'''( 	Dealers	fill	investor	and	hedger	orders	Dealers	observe	aggregate	order	flow:	,":''' 		 	 	Round	IV	 	 Dealers	quote	prices:	%":'0( 	Investors	place	orders:	)":'0$ 	Dealers	fill	investors’	orders	Inter-dealer	trade:	*":'0( ,	+":'0( 															 		
1.1 Overview
The model describes trading between a large number of dealers, investors, and hedgers over a trading
day. There is one risky asset that represents Forex and one risk-free asset with a daily return of 1+r.
Market participants comprise a continuum of investors, a continuum of hedgers, and a finite number
of Forex dealers. Both investors and dealers are risk-averse and choose their trades optimally, while
hedgers trade for exogenous reasons. There are four rounds of trading each day; denoted as i, ii, iii
and iv. When necessary, I use the notation Xt:j to identify variable X in round j = {i, ii, iii iv}
on day t. Figure 1 shows the sequence of events.
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At the start of round i on day t, public information arrives in the form of a payoﬀ, Pt, paid
to the current holders of Forex. Each investor n also receives foreign income, Y nt . This is private
information to each investor and provides their motive for trading Forex. Next, each dealer d
simultaneously and independently quotes a scalar price, Sdt:i, at which they will fill investors’ orders
to buy or sell Forex. Prices are observed by all dealers and investors and are good for orders of
any size. Each investor n then places their optimally chosen order, Ont:i, where positive (negative)
values denote purchases (sales) of Forex. Orders may be placed with more than one dealer. If two
or more dealers quote the same price, the order is randomly assigned among them. Dealers then fill
the investors’ orders they receive.
Round II is a round of inter-dealer trading. As above, each dealer d simultaneously and inde-
pendently quotes a scalar price Sdt:ii at which they will trade Forex with other dealers. Quoted prices
are observed by all and are good for inter-dealer trades of any size. Each dealer then simultane-
ously and independently trades on the quotes. I denote the Forex orders made by dealer d as T dt:ii
and orders received by dealer d as Zdt:ii. When dealer d initiates a purchases (sale) of Forex, T dt:ii is
positive (negative). Positive (negative) values of Zdt:ii denote purchases (sales) of Forex initiated by
another dealer. Once again, trading with multiple dealers is feasible. If multiple dealers quote the
same price, trades are allocated equally between them. At the end of round-ii trading all dealers
observe aggregate inter-dealer order flow, Xt:ii =
Pd
d=1 T
d
t:ii.
At the start of round iii, dealers quote prices Sdt:iii at which they will fill Forex orders from
investors, hedgers and other dealers. Each investor n and hedger h then place their orders, Ont:iii
and Hht:iii, with dealers following the protocol in round i. Dealers then engage in another round of
inter-dealer trading (as in round ii) and fill their orders from investors and hedgers. At the end of
the round, all dealers observe aggregate inter-dealer order flow, Xt:iii =
Pd
d=1 T
d
t:iii.
Finally, to begin round iv, all dealers quote prices Sdt:iv for investor and inter-dealer trades.
Investors then place their orders Ont:iv with dealers. After dealers have filled these orders, they
engage in inter-dealer trade as in rounds ii and iii.
Before describing the details of the model, a few comments concerning its structure are in
order. In this benchmark configuration, the model describes the process through which inter-dealer
trading aggregates the information contained in investor and hedgers’ orders, and dealers use their
observations on aggregate order flow to embed that information into their price quotes. Investors’
orders in rounds i, iii and iv convey information about foreign income, while hedgers’ orders convey
information about exogenous shocks to aggregate hedging demand. Inter-dealer trading in rounds
ii and iii aggregates the information from earlier customer orders. In Section 3, I make one small
modification to accommodate front-running: hedgers must now place their orders with dealers
immediately after they observe round-ii prices. This means that dealers have advanced information
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on the hedgers’ orders they must fill in round iii when they trade with other dealers in round ii.
One focal point of my analysis is on how dealers use this information. Notice, also, that dealers
use their observations on aggregate orders flows from inter-dealer trading in rounds ii and iii to
determine the prices they quote at the start of the next trading round. Thus, the price-impact of
order flow is determined endogenously as part of the model’s equilibrium.
1.2 Market Participants
1.2.1 Investors
There are a continuum of investors indexed by n 2 [0, 1]. Each investor chooses Forex orders on
day t to maximize expected utility defined over wealth on day t+ 1:
Unt:j = E
⇥ ! exp( !Wnt+1:i)|⌦nt:j⇤ , (1)
with ! > 0, where Wnt+1:i is the wealth of investor n at the start of round i on day t + 1, and ⌦nt:j
is the information available to the investor when making their round j trading decision. Investors
receive two pieces of information in round i: public information on the Forex payoﬀ and private
information on their foreign income. The payoﬀ follows a random walk with daily increments,
Pt = Pt 1 + Vt, Vt ⇠ i.i.d.N(0, 2v), (2)
while foreign income comprises an aggregate component Yt and an idiosyncratic component "nt ,
Y nt = Yt + "
n
t "
n
t ⇠ i.i.d.N(0, 2"). (3)
Investors do not initially observe either income component but the value of Yt is inferred from
their observation of dealers’ price quotes over the trading day. I denote the set of d = 1, 2..d price
quotes in round j by {Sdt:j}. Investors’ information evolves as ⌦nt:i =
 {Sdt:i}, Y nt ,Pt,⌦nt 1:iv and
⌦nt:j = {{Sdt:j},⌦nt:j 1} for rounds j = {ii, iii, iv}.
Investors place Forex orders with dealers at the start of rounds i, iii and iv that maximize
expected utility subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
Wnt:iv = A
n
t:iii St:iv +A
n
t:i St:iii +W
n
t:i + St:iY
n
t , (4a)
Wnt+1:i = A
n
t:ivRt+1 + (1 + r)W
n
t:iv, (4b)
where  St:j = St:j St:j 1 is the change in price between rounds j 1 and j, Rt+1 = St+1:i+Pt+1 
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(1 + r)St:iv is the overnight excess return on Forex, and Ant:j is investor n’s holding of Forex after
trading in round j. In round i, investor n chooses an order of Ont:i = Ant:i Ant 1:iv Y nt , where Ant:i is
their desired round-i position that maximizes Unt:i subject to (4) with information ⌦nt:i. In round iii,
the investor’s order is Ont:iii = Ant:iii Ant:i, where their choice for Ant:iii maximizes Unt:iii subject to (4)
with information ⌦nt:iii. Similarly, their round iv order is Ont:iv = Ant:iv   Ant:iii, where the choice for
Ant:iv maximizes Unt:iv subject to (4b) with information ⌦nt:iv. Thus, positive (negative) values for Ont:j
represent investors’ purchase (sale) orders of Forex because they facilitate an increase (decrease) in
their desired Forex position. Notice, also, that the Forex orders placed in any round will generally
diﬀer across investors because they are determined by diﬀerent information and existing positions.
Despite this heterogeneity in investors’ orders, it turns out that in equilibrium investors hold the
entire stock of Forex overnight. I denote this stock by At =
´ 1
0 A
n
t:ivdn.
1.2.2 Hedgers
Hedgers provide a source of external Forex orders that do not depend on Forex prices or other
market conditions. There is a continuum of hedgers indexed by h 2 [0, 1] who place Forex orders
Hht at the start of round iii. Individual hedger’s orders comprise a common component Ht and
an idiosyncratic component ⇠ht . The common component depends on the stock of Forex held by
investors overnight, and a random shock:
Ht = (1   )At 1 +Ht Ht ⇠ i.i.d.N(0, 2h), (5)
with 0 <  < 1. This specification implies that hedgers Forex orders on day t are exogenous with
respect to Forex trading on day t. I assume that Ht depends on At 1 for analytical convenience -
it ensures that At follows a stationary AR(1) process in equilibrium which simplifies the analysis.
1.2.3 Dealers
Dealers play a central role in the model. Unlike investors and hedgers, there are d dealers in the
market (indexed by d) that act strategically when choosing their price quotes and engaging in inter-
dealer trade. These quote and trading decisions take the form of a multi-stage simultaneous move
game. One stage of the game occurs at the start of each round when dealers must simultaneously
quote prices, {Sdt:j}. The other stage occurs in rounds ii, iii and iv when each dealer simultaneously
initiates trades against other dealers’ quotes. At each decision point on day t, dealer d chooses a
quote or trade that maximizes expected utility defined over wealth on day t+1, given the equilibrium
decisions of other dealers. The resulting quotes and trades identify a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium
(BNE).
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Dealers receive three types of information during the trading day: (i) public information on the
Forex payoﬀ in round i, (ii) market-wide information on prices and aggregate inter-dealer order
flows, and (iii) private information on the Forex orders they receive from investors, hedgers, and
other dealers. It proves useful to distinguish between the information available to dealer d at the
start of each round j, Idt:j , and the information available when trading decisions are made, Fdt:j .
During day t, these information sets evolve according to
Idt:i =
n
Pt,Fdt 1:iv
o
, Fdt:i = {{Sdt:i}, Idt:i}, (6a)
Idt:ii =
n
Odt:i,Fdt:i
o
, Fdt:ii =
n
{Sdt:ii}, Idt:ii
o
, (6b)
Idt:iii =
n
Xt:ii, Z
d
t:ii,Fdt:ii
o
, Fdt:iii =
n
Odt:iii,Hdt , {Sdt:iii}, Idt:iii
o
, (6c)
Idt:iv =
n
Xt:iii, Z
d
t:iii,Fdt:iii
o
, Fdt:iv =
n
Odt:iv, {Sdt:iv}, Idt:iv
o
. (6d)
Each dealer d enters day t with information Fdt 1:iv and observes the new Forex payoﬀ Pt, so they
begin with information Idt:i =
 Pt,Fdt 1:iv when quoting round-i prices. After round-i prices have
been quoted, dealer d’s information is Fdt:i = {{Sdt:i}, Idt:i}. By the start of round ii, the dealer has
additional information on the investors’ orders received in round i, which are denoted by Odt:i, so
Idt:ii =
 
Odt:i,Fdt:i
 
. This information is supplemented by dealers’ round-ii quotes {Sdt:ii} before the
dealer trades in round ii using Fdt:ii =
 {Sdt:ii}, Idt:ii . By the start of round iii, the dealer knows the
orders he received from other dealers during round ii, Zdt:ii, and aggregate order flow, Xt:ii, so these
variables appear in Idt:iii. Next, dealers quote round iii prices and receive orders from investors and
hedgers, Odt:iii and Hdt , so these variables add to the information used in making round-iii trading
decisions Fdt:iii. By the start of round iv, each dealer knows the orders they received from other
dealers and aggregate order flow from round iii, so these variables appear in Idt:iv. Finally, by the
time dealers trade in round iv, they know prices {Sdt:iv} and investors’ orders, Odt:iv.
Each dealer d quotes prices and makes trading decisions to maximize expected utility
Udt:j = E
h
 ! exp( !W dt+1:i)|⌦dt:j
i
, (7)
whereW dt+1:i is the wealth of dealer d at the start of round i on day t+1, and ⌦dt:j is the information
available to the dealer when making the decision (i.e., ⌦dt:j = Idt:j when the dealer quotes prices and
⌦dt:j = Fdt:j when the dealer initiates inter-dealer trades). Because all price quotes are observable to
market participants and are good for any amount, the BNE strategy for each dealer is to quote a
common price at the start of each trading round (i.e., Sdt:j = St:j for d = 1, 2, ..d). Below I show how
this price depends on dealers’ common information, It:j = \dIdt:j . The BNE strategy for dealers’
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inter-dealer trades in rounds ii, iii and iv take the form:
T dt:ii = }
d
t:ii + E
h
Zdt:ii|Fdt:ii
i
 Adt:i, (8a)
T dt:iii = }
d
t:iii + E
h
Zdt:iii|Fdt:iii
i
+Hdt +Odt:iii  Adt:ii, and (8b)
T dt:iv = }
d
t:iv + E
h
Zdt:iv|Fdt:iv
i
+Odt:iv  Adt:iii, (8c)
where }dt:j , denotes the dealer’s desired position in round j, and Adt:j is the dealer’s actual Forex
holding at the end of round j. In words, the dealer’s BNE strategy is to initiate trades that achieve
their desired position net the orders from investors, hedgers and other dealers they expect to fill. In
rounds iii and iv dealers condition their trades on the orders from investors Odt:j and hedgers Hdt . In
contrast, dealers cannot condition their trades on the orders from other dealers, Zdt:j , because inter-
dealer trading decisions are made simultaneously. Instead, their BNE strategy is based on expected
orders, E[Zdt:j |Fdt:j ]. As a consequence, dealers actual end-of-round positions are Adt:j = }dt:j   ⇠dt:j ,
where ⇠dt:j = Zdt:j   E[Zdt:j |Fdt:j ] is the error in forecasting the incoming orders from other dealers.
Dealers choose their desire positions }dt:j to maximize expected utility subject to the sequence
of the budget constraints:
W dt:ii =W
i
d,t +A
d
t:i St:ii, (9a)
W dt:iii =W
d
t:ii + (}
d
t:ii   ⇠dt:ii) St:iii, (9b)
W dt:iv =W
d
t:iii + (}
d
t:iii   ⇠dt:iii) St:iv, and (9c)
W dt+1:i = (1 + r)W
d
t:iv + (}
d
t:iv   ⇠dt:iv)Rt+1, (9d)
where Adt:i = Adt 1:iv  Odt:i. In round ii, dealer d chooses }dt:ii to maximize Udt:ii subject to (9) with
information Fdt:ii. To implement this choice, they initiate inter-dealer trades T dt:ii identified in (8a).
Similarly, dealer d chooses }dt:iii to maximize Udt:iii with information Fdt:iii, and }dt:iv to maximize Udt:iv
with information Fdt:iv both subject to (9), and these choices are implemented by trades T dt:iii and
T dt:iv identified in (8b) and (8c). Notice that all of these decisions take account of the fact that the
orders from other dealers are in general unpredictable, so the associated forecast errors ⇠dt:j represent
an additional source of risk.
1.3 Market Clearing Conditions
There are three sets of market clearing conditions to consider: those for investors’ orders, hedgers’
orders, and inter-dealer trading. In round i, the aggregate imbalance in investors’ orders, Ot:i defined
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by the integral on the left, must equal the sum of the orders received by the d dealers, on the right.
ˆ 1
0
(Ant:i  Ant 1:iv   Y nt:i)dn = Ot:i =
Xd
d=1
Odt:i. (10)
Furthermore, in the BNE where all dealers quote the same prices, investors’ orders are randomly
assigned across dealers. I therefore assume that the order received by dealer d is Odt:i = 1dOt:i + ⇣
d
t:i
with ⇣dt:i ⇠ i.d.N(0, 2⇣ ). The allocation shocks ⇣dt:i are negatively correlated across the dealers, with
correlation ⇢ =  (d  1) 1, so that Pdd=1 ⇣dt:i = 0, as required by market clearing.
In rounds iii and iv, market clearing similarly requires that
ˆ 1
0
(Ant:iii  Ant:i)dn = Ot:iii =
Xd
d=1
Odt:iii, (11a)
ˆ 1
0
(Ant:iv  Ant:iii)dn = Ot:iv =
Xd
d=1
Odt:iv (11b)
The orders received by individual dealers in rounds iii and iv are subject to mean-zero normally
distributed allocation shocks, ⇣dt:iii and ⇣dt:iv, respectively. The market clearing condition for round-iii
hedge orders is given by
1ˆ
0
Hht dh = Ht =
Xd
d=1
Hdt (12)
As above, the hedge orders received by dealer d are Hdt = Ht + ⌘dt with ⌘dt ⇠ i.d.N(0, 2⌘), where ⌘dt
is an allocation shock which is negatively correlated across dealers so that
Pd
d=1⌘
d
t = 0.
The market clearing condition for inter-dealer trades is given byXd
d=1
Zdt:j =
Xd
d=1
T dt:j = Xt:j for j = {ii,iii, iv}. (13)
Here, the sum of orders received by dealers on the left equals the total imbalance in orders initiated
by dealers, which in turn defines aggregate inter-dealer order flow. Under the trading protocol,
orders are equally split between dealers quoting the same price, so in the BNE each dealer receives
a equal fraction of aggregate order flow: Zdt:j =
1
dXt:j .
In all the equilibria I study, investors hold the entire stock of Forex overnight. Daily changes
in this stock, At, must therefore reflect diﬀerences between aggregate foreign income received by
investors and the aggregate imbalance in Forex orders by hedgers: At = At 1+Yt Ht. Combining
this expression with equation (5) gives
At =  At 1 + Yt  Ht. (14)
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Since both Yt and Ht are mean-zero random variables, the Forex stock follows a stationary AR(1)
process. Forex prices are ultimately driven by this process and the random walk for the Forex payoﬀ
in (2).
2 The Benchmark Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the benchmark model comprises: (i) the BNE strategies that identify the prices
dealers quote at the start of each trading round, (ii) the inter-dealer trades initiate by dealers in
rounds ii, iii and iv, and (iii) the set of investors’ orders in rounds i, iii and iv. All of these trading
decisions must be optimal in the sense that they maximize the expected utility of the respective
agent based on the available information and they must be consistent with market clearing given the
exogenously determined orders of hedgers. I further restrict my attention to eﬃcient risk-sharing
equilibria in which investors and hedgers hold the entire stock of Forex overnight. The focus on
such equilibria is standard (see, e.g., Lyons, 1997, Evans and Lyons, 2002, and Evans, 2011), and is
consistent with the empirical fact that dealers generally do not hold open positions overnight and
the half-lives of the intraday positions are measured in minutes (see, e.g., Lyons, 1995, and Bjønnes
and Rime, 2005).
The following theorem describes the benchmark equilibrium.4
Theorem 1. In an eﬃcient risk-sharing equilibrium, overnight returns and intraday price changes
follow
Rt ⌘ St:i + Pt   (1 + r)St 1:iv = ⇤iAt 1 + 1+rr Vt, (15a)
 St:ii ⌘ St:ii   St:i = 0, (15b)
 St:iii ⌘ St:iii   St:ii = ⇤iiiAt 1   11  +r⇤Yt   1 ⇤ivYt, and (15c)
 St:iv ⌘ St:iv   St:iii = ⇤ivAt 1 + 1 ⇤ivYt + 11  +r⇤Ht, (15d)
where ⇤ = ⇤i + ⇤iii + ⇤iv for some coeﬃcients ⇤i. Investors’ orders in rounds i and iii are given
by
Ont:i =  yi Y nt +  ai At 1, and (16a)
Ont:iii =  yiiiYt +  aiiiAt 1, (16b)
4Mathematical derivations and proofs are in the Appendix.
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for some coeﬃcients  j. Unexpected order flows from inter-dealer trading in rounds ii and iii are
Xt:ii   E[Xt:ii|It:ii] =  yYt, and (17a)
Xt:iii   E[Xt:iii|It:iii] =  hHt, (17b)
for some coeﬃcients  y and  h, where It:j = \dIdt:j denote dealers’ common information at the
start of round j.
2.1 Qualitative Analysis
To explain the economic intuition behind this equilibrium, it is useful to start with the determination
of round iv prices. Eﬃcient risk-sharing requires that the outstanding stock of Forex is held by
the continuum of investors rather than any of the d dealers at the end of the day. In equilibrium,
dealers have suﬃcient information to find this price by inverting investors’ aggregate demand for
Forex to give
St:iv =
1X
i=1
⇣
1
1+r
⌘i
E[Pt+i   ⇤At+i 1|It:iv],
= 1rPt   11  +r⇤At, (18)
where ⇤ = ⇤i + ⇤iii + ⇤iv. The second line in this expression follows from the processes for Pt
and At in (2) and (14). The ⇤i coeﬃcients identify equilibrium expected returns and price changes:
E [Rt|It 1:iv] = ⇤iAt 1, E [ St:iii|It:i] = ⇤iiiAt 1, and E [ St:iv|It:i] = ⇤ivAt 1. Equation (18)
shows that dealers quote a round-iv price equal to the present value of future payoﬀs adjusted for
the risk premia necessary to ensure eﬃcient current and future risk-sharing.
The evolution of prices, investors orders and aggregate order flow shown in Theorem 1 represent
the process through which dealers acquire the information needed to quote St:iv. Dealers observe the
value of Pt directly, and the information is immediately incorporated into their round i quote, as is
reflected in (15a). In contrast, dealers become informed about the value of At (=  At 1+Yt Ht) via
trading. In particular, dealers learn about foreign income Yt through a two-stage process. In the first
stage dealers receive information via investors’ round-i orders because they (optimally) depend on
each investors’ income, Y nt = Yt+"nt , as shown in (16a). Because dealers use the orders they received
in round i as the basis for their inter-dealer trades in round ii, in the second stage the information
originally contained in investors’ orders is revealed to dealers by their observation on aggregate
order flow Xt:ii. Equation (17a) shows that unexpected order flow is proportional to foreign income
Yt. Dealers incorporate this information into their round iii quotes, so Yt contributes to  St:iii,
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as shown by (15c). Dealers learn about the hedging shock Ht through an analogous process. The
inter-dealer trades initiated in round iii depend, in part, on the hedgers’ orders each dealer receives
at the start of the round and so carry information about Ht. This information is aggregated and
revealed to all dealers by order flow Xt:iii, as is shown by (17b). In sum, inter-dealer trading in
rounds ii and iii aggregates the information about foreign income and the hedging shock that is
initially conveyed to dealers in dispersed form by investors’ round-i orders, and hedgers’ round-iii
orders. Dealers then embed this information into the prices they quote in rounds iii and iv, so as
to achieve an eﬃcient risk-sharing allocation by the end of the day.
In anticipation of the analysis below, it proves useful to examine two features of this process
in greater detail. The first concerns the dependency of investors’ round-i orders on their foreign
income, Y nt . Investors choose these orders optimally, so it is worthwhile examining how and why
these choices depend on Y nt . The second feature concerns the link between dealers’ trading decisions
in rounds ii and iii and aggregate order flows, Xt:ii and Xt:iii. Again, inter-dealer trades are chosen
optimally (as part of each dealer’s BNE strategy), so it is useful to understand why the values of
Xt:ii and Xt:iii induced by these trades convey information on Yt and Ht.
To begin, consider the equations that describe investor n0s optimal Forex holdings:
Ant:i = ⇥
n
i|siiiE[St:iii   St:i|⌦nt:i] +⇥ni|sivE[ St:iv|⌦nt:i] +⇥ni|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:i], (19a)
Ant:iii = ⇥
n
iii|sivE[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii] +⇥niii|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii], and (19b)
Ant:iv = ⇥
n
iv|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:iv], (19c)
where the coeﬃcients, ⇥ni|j , ⇥
n
iii|j and ⇥
n
iv|j depend on the conditional second moments of  St:iii,
 St:iv and Rt+1. Here we see that the investor’s optimal Forex holdings depend linearly on expected
future intraday changes in prices and overnight returns. As in standard mean-variance portfolio
problems, the round-iv choice is proportional to the expected overnight return E[Rt+1|⌦nt:iv]. In this
instance the coeﬃcient ⇥niv|r equals 1/(!V[Rt+1|⌦nt:iv]), were V[.|.] denotes the conditional variance.
In the earlier rounds, the investor faces a more complex problem of exploiting expected price changes
in the near term while hedging against future risks. These hedging motives make Ant:i and Ant:iii
dependent on the expected overnight return E[Rt+1|⌦nt:], and Ant:i dependent on E[ St:iv|⌦nt:i].
By definition, the round-i order of investor n is Ont:i ⌘ Ant:i   Ant 1:iv   Y nt . Combing this
expression with (19a) and the equilibrium price dynamics in (15) gives
Ont:i =
n
1
 ⇤iv(⇥
n
i|siv  ⇥ni|siii)  11  +r⇤⇥ni|siii +⇥ni|r⇤i
o
E[Yt|⌦nt:i]
+
n
⇥ni|siii⇤iii +⇥
n
i|siv⇤iv +  ⇥
n
i|r⇤i   1
o
At 1   Y nt . (20)
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The first term on the right-hand-side identifies the impact of private information on Ant:i. Because
each investors’ income comprises an aggregate and idiosyncratic component, their estimate of of Yt
is given by
E[Yt|⌦nt:i] = GnyY nt , with Gny =
 2y
 2y +  
2
"
.
Thus, foreign income Y nt has both an indirect speculated eﬀect on the investor’s order via the first
term in (20), and a direct eﬀect via the last term. The strength of the speculative eﬀect depends
on the precision of the information as measured by the gain coeﬃcient Gny. It also depends on
the investor’s risk aversion and the “riskiness” of future returns via the ⇥ni|j coeﬃcients. So, taken
together, the size of the speculative eﬀect depends on the precision of the information in Y nt and the
willingness of the investor to speculate on the information. This endogenous link between foreign
income and investors’ orders plays an important role in the analysis below.
Next, I consider the link between aggregate order flow and inter-dealer trades in round ii. In
equilibrium dealers do not hold overnight Forex positions, so their round ii trades from (8a) become
T dt:ii = }
d
t:ii + E
⇥
Zdt:ii|⌦dt:ii
⇤
+ Odt:i, where Odt:i denotes the investors’ orders received by dealer d in
round i. Furthermore, because dealers quote the same round-ii price, they expect to receive an equal
fraction of aggregate order flow from other dealers: E
⇥
Zdt:ii|⌦dt:ii
⇤
= 1dE
⇥
Xt:ii|⌦dt:ii
⇤
. Combining these
expressions with the definition of aggregate order flow, gives
Xt:ii =
Xd
d=1
}dt:ii +
1
d
Xd
d=1
E[Xt:ii|⌦dt:ii] +Ot:i, (21)
where Ot:i =
Pd
d=1Odt:i is the aggregate imbalance in the investors’ round-i orders. This imbal-
ance contains information concerning Yt because it aggregates investors’ orders in (16a): Ot:i =´ 1
0 { yi Y nt:i +  ai At 1} dn =  yi Yt +  ai At 1. Thus, order flow aggregates information on foreign in-
come because each dealer follows a BNE trading strategy that conditions on a subset of investors’
round-i orders that individually contain dispersed information on Yt.
Equation (21) identifies two further channels of information aggregation. The first operates
through the aggregation of dealers’ positions,
Pd
d=1 }
d
t:ii. Each dealer’s desired position can be
written as
}dt:ii =  
d
ii|siiiE[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii] +  dii|sivE[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii], and (22a)
}dt:iii =  
d
iii|sivE[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii], (22b)
where the coeﬃcients  dii|j and  
d
iii|j are determined by the conditional second moments of  St:iii,
 St:iv and unexpected inter-dealer orders. Notice that each dealers’ round-ii position, }dt:ii depends
on their private forecasts for  St:iii and  St:iv. In equilibrium, these forecasts depend on the
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dealer’s estimate of Yt:
E[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii] = ⇤iiiAt 1   ( 11  +r⇤+ 1 ⇤iv)E[Yt|⌦dt:ii], and
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii] = ⇤ivAt 1 + 1 ⇤ivE[Yt|⌦dt:ii].
Because dealers quote the same round-i price, they receive a random fraction of investors orders,
Odt:i = 1dOt:i+ ⇣
d
t:i, which represent a noisy signal on Yt. Each dealer can therefore estimate Yt based
on these orders as
E[Yt|⌦dt:ii] = Gdy(Odt:i   E[Odt:i|Idt:i]) = Gdy( 1d yi Yt + ⇣dt:i), with Gdy =
1
d 
y
i  
2
y
( 1d 
y
i )
2 2y +  
2
⇣
.
Consequently, round-ii order flow aggregates the private information dealers use to determine their
desired position via the
Pd
d=1 }
d
t:ii term in (21). The remaining channel of information aggregate op-
erates through dealers’ expectations of incoming orders,
Pd
d=1 E
⇥
Zdt:ii|⌦dt:ii
⇤
= 1d
Pd
d=1 E[Xt:ii|⌦dt:ii].
In this case dealers use their private estimates of income to compute E
⇥
Xt:ii|⌦dt:ii
⇤
=  yE[Yt|⌦dt:ii],
which forms part of the BNE trading strategy.
Round-iii order flow aggregates information in an analogous manner. In this case the counterpart
to equation (21) is
Xt:iii =
Xd
d=1
}dt:iii +
1
d
Xd
d=1
E[Xt:iii|⌦dt:iii] +Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i. (23)
The last three terms equal the diﬀerence between the aggregate imbalance in round-iii orders by
investors and hedgers Ht+Ot:iii =
Pd
d=1(Hdt +Odt:iii), and existing dealer holdings
Pd
d=1A
d
t:ii, which
equal  Ot:i by market clearing. The aggregate imbalance in hedge orders aggregates information
on the Ht shock directly, because Ht = (1   )At 1 +Ht. By contrast, the aggregate imbalance in
investors’ orders, Ot:iii, carries no new information because Yt was revealed to dealers by Xt:ii. As
in round ii, order flow also aggregates the private information dealers use to forecast returns and
incoming orders. In this case, hedge orders are the source of dealers’ private information, producing
estimates of Ht:
E[Ht|⌦dt:iii] = Gdh(Hdt   E[Hdt |Idt:iii]) = Gdh( 1dHt + ⌘dt ), wih Gdh =
1
d 
2
h
( 1d)
2 2h +  
2
⌘
.
These estimates provide dealers’ forecasts of E[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii] used to determine desired positions }dt:iii,
and their forecasts E
⇥
Xdt:iii|⌦dt:iii
⇤
.
One further feature of the benchmark equilibrium deserves comment: the origin of the At 1
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terms in (15). Under eﬃcient risk sharing, investors hold the available stock of Forex overnight,
so At =
´ 1
0 A
h
t dn =
´ 1
0 ⇥
n
iv|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:iv]dn. In equilibrium, investors have common forecasts of
returns (i.e., E[Rt+1|⌦nt:iv] = E[Rt+1|It:iv] for all n), so this condition pins down the overnight risk
premium as
E[Rt+1|It:iv] = ⇤iAt, with ⇤i =
⇢ˆ 1
0
⇥niv|rdn
  1
. (24)
The intraday risk premia are similarly determined by market clearing. In particular, (21) and (23)
imply that
Pd
d=1 E[}
d
t:ii|It:i] =  E[Ot:i|It:i] and
Pd
d=1 E
⇥
}dt:iii|It:i
⇤
=  E[Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i|It:i]. The
left-hand-side of these equations identify the expected dealer demand to hold Forex in rounds ii and
iii, while the right-hand-side identifies the available supply from the external orders from investors
and hedgers. When combined with (19) and (22), these expressions imply that
E[ St:iii|It:i] = ⇤iiiAt 1, ⇤iii =
1   ⇥i|R⇤i
 ii|siii +⇥i|siii
   ii|siv +⇥i|siv
 ii|siii +⇥i|siii
⇤iv, (25a)
E[ St:iv|It:i] = ⇤ivAt 1, ⇤iv =
 (1 ⇥iii|R⇤i)
 iii|siv +⇥iii|siv
, (25b)
where  j|i =
Pd
d=1 
d
j|i and ⇥i|j =
´ 1
0 ⇥
n
i|jdn. Notice that the intraday premia depend on both
dealers’ and investors’ preferences via the  j|i and ⇥i|j terms, whereas the overnight premia reflect
investors’ preferences alone. In general, the intraday risk premia are smaller when there are a larger
number of dealers available to share the (ex ante) risks of open intraday positions.
2.2 Quantitative Analysis
The equations describing the benchmark equilibrium in Theorem 1 contain coeﬃcients that are
themselves defined by a set of highly non-linear equations. It is therefore necessary to consider
numerical solutions to these equations if we are to examine the benchmark equilibrium in any
greater detail. I will also use these numerical solutions to study the eﬀects of front-running and
information-sharing below.
Table 1 shows the parameter values used in the numerical analysis of the benchmark equilibrium.
I set the number of dealers in the market to 20. This choice is consistent with the fact that most
Forex dealing activity is concentrated in ten or so global banks. The daily interest rate r is set equal
to 0.0001, which implies an annualized rate of approximately two percent. Investors and dealers
are assumed to have the same preferences, with a coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion ! equal to 2.
The  coeﬃcient governing the equilibrium At process is 0.999. This choice makes daily changes in
Forex prices extremely hard to forecast.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Number of dealers d 20
Risk free rate r 0.0001
Risk aversion ! 2
AR(1) coeﬀ.  0.999
Payoﬀ Shocks  v 0.00001
Income Shocks  y 0.007
Hedge Shocks  h 0.0035
Investor Gain Gny [0.0001,.......0.01]
Dealer Gain Gdh [0.02,.......0.04]
Notes: The table shows the parameter values used in the numerical
analysis of the benchmark equilibrium.
Three shocks drive Forex prices in the model: the payoﬀ shocks Vt, the shocks to foreign income
Yt, and the shocks to hedgers’ Forex orders, Ht. I calibrate the standard deviations of these shocks
so that payoﬀ shocks account for approximately ten percent of the daily change in Forex prices. In
equilibrium Vt shocks are directly incorporated into dealers’ quotes whereas Yt and Ht shocks aﬀect
quotes via their impact on order flows. So this calibration ensures that order flows are the proximate
cause of approximately 90 percent of the variance in equilibrium Forex prices. My calibration also
implies that the Ht shocks contribute 20 percent of the variance in At. This means that shocks to
foreign income are the primary driver of external Forex orders.
The two remaining parameters have important quantitative implications for the benchmark
equilibrium. The inferences investors draw about aggregate income Yt depend on the relative
variance of idiosyncratic income shocks  2" and aggregate income  2y: E[Yt|⌦nt:i] = GnyY nt , where
Gny =  2y/( 2y +  2"). To examine how the precision of these inferences aﬀect the equilibrium, I
consider diﬀerent values for  2" than imply gain coeﬃcients Gny ranging from 0.0001 to 0.01. Larger
values for Gny imply that individual investors’ income Y nt conveys more precise information about
aggregate income, which they take into account when determining their Forex orders.
The second parameter aﬀects dealers’ inferences concerning the Ht shock based on hedgers’
orders: E[Ht|⌦dt:iii] = Gdh( 1dHt + ⌘dt ), where Gdh = ( 1d 2h)/(( 1d)2 2h +  2⌘). Here I consider diﬀerent
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values for the variance of the distribution shock  2⌘ that imply gain coeﬃcients ranging from 0.02 to
0.04. Again, larger values for the gain coeﬃcient imply that dealers have more precise information
about Ht based on the hedgers’ orders they receive.5 I also assume that the distribution shocks
aﬀecting hedgers’ orders have the same variance as the distribution shocks aﬀecting the investors’
orders dealers receive in rounds i and iii: i.e.,  2⇣ =  
2
⌘.
Figure 2 plots six key coeﬃcients from the benchmark equilibrium. Panels A and B plot the
coeﬃcients governing the intraday risk premia, ⇤iii and ⇤iv, against the investor gain coeﬃcient
Gny for the case where the dealers’ gain Gdh equals 0.02 and 0.04. In this calibration of the model
⇤i = 0.02, so the intraday risk premia implied by the values of ⇤iii and ⇤iv are an order of magnitude
smaller than the overnight risk premia. These plots show that the intraday risk premia are smaller
(in absolute value) in equilibria where investors have more precise information about aggregate
income; i.e., where Gny is larger. Intuitively, investors require less compensation for holding risky
intraday Forex positions when they have more precise information about the shock to aggregate
income that aﬀects intraday changes in Forex prices. Panels A and B also show that ⇤iii and ⇤iv
are smaller in equilibria where hedgers’ orders contain more precise information on the Ht shocks.
Again, this feature arises because dealers face less risk from intraday price changes.
Panels C and D show how the sensitivity of dealers’ desired positions (in rounds ii and iii)
to expected price changes varies across the equilibria. As one would expect, dealers take more
aggressive positions in equilibria where they have more precise information (i.e., the  dii|siii and
 diii|siv are bigger in equilibria where the dealers’ gain Gdh is larger), because the risk associated with
Ht shocks is smaller. Notice, also, that dealers take on more aggressive positions in equilibria where
investors have more precise information. This feature arises because dealers learn more about Yt
based on the investors’ orders they receive in round i. When individual investors have more precise
information about aggregate income, their round-iorders contain a larger speculative component, so
the orders received by each dealer are more informative about Yt. In other words, dealers become
more aggressive in their position-taking when they obtain more precise price-relevant information
from external orders.
The lower panels of Figure 2 show how aggregate order flow in rounds ii and iii relate to the
Yt and Ht shocks across the equilibria. Recall that unexpected order flow in round ii is given by
Xt:ii   E[Xt:ii|It:ii] =  yYt. The plots in Panel E show that  y is more negative in equilibria where
5For more perspective on the size of the gain coeﬃcients, it is useful to compare the conditional and unconditional
variances of the underlying variables. The variance of foreign income conditioned on an investor’s round-i information
is V[Yt|⌦nt:i] = (1   Gny ) 2y, so values for Gny between 0.0001 to 0.01 mean that an observation on Y nt reduces the
conditional variance for Yt by between 0.01 and 1 percent. The conditional variance of Ht based on dealers’ hedge
orders is V[Ht|⌦dt:iii] = (1   1dGdh) 2h, so the values for Gdh imply that the conditional variance is reduced by between
0.1 and 0.2 percent.
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Figure 2: Benchmark Equilibrium
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Notes: The figure plots coeﬃcients from the benchmark equilibrium against the
investors gain, Gny ⇥100, for the case where the dealers’ gain Gdh equals 0.02 (solid
plots) and 0.04 (dashed plots).
investors and dealers have more precise information. As was noted above, investors’ round-i orders
contain a larger speculative component when they have more precise information, so that dealers’
round-ii trading strategies are more sensitive to aggregate income. In addition, dealers learn more
about Yt from the investors’ orders they receive and so aim to take more aggressive round-ii positions.
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The net eﬀect is that positive income shocks induced individual dealers to initiate greater sales of
Forex in inter-dealer trading, which in aggregate produces a larger unexpected negative order flow.
The incentives for dealers to take aggressive round-ii positions are magnified when they have more
precise information about Ht shocks, so income shocks have larger order flow eﬀects under these
circumstances. In round iii, unexpected order flow is given by Xt:iii   E[Xt:iii|It:iii] =  hHt. As
panel F shows, the size of the  h coeﬃcient does not vary across equilibria with diﬀerent investor
gain coeﬃcients. By round iii the value of Yt is common knowledge to dealers and investors, so
the precision of investors’ round-i information is no longer relevant. In contrast, the precision of
dealers’ information concerning Ht has a sizable impact on  h. When dealers receive more precise
information concerning a positive Ht shock from the hedgers’ orders they receive, they aim to
take more aggressive long positions and so initiate larger purchases in inter-dealer trading which in
aggregate produce a larger positive order flow.
To summarize, in the benchmark equilibrium dispersed information about the Yt and Ht shocks
is transmitted to dealers via the external orders they receive from investors and hedgers, aggregated
via inter-dealer trading, and then embedded into Forex prices.
3 Front-Running
I make one small modification to the model in order to accommodate front-running. I now assume
that hedgers place their Forex orders immediately after dealers quote prices at the start of round
ii rather than at the start of round iii. This means that dealers know the hedgers’ orders they
will need to fill at the end of round iii before they begin inter-dealer trading in round ii. The new
timing of events in rounds ii and iii are shown in Figure 3.
In this section, I analyze how dealers trade on hedger-order information in round ii and how
the trades aﬀect round iii prices and other aspects of the equilibrium. To facilitate this analysis, I
proceed in two steps. First, I consider how an individual dealer would act if he alone had access to
hedgers’ orders at the start of round ii. Then, I analyze the equilibrium in which all dealers receive
their hedgers’ orders in round ii.
3.1 Unilateral Front-Running
To examine the incentives for front-running, consider how a single dealer (d = 1) would use the
information contained in hedgers’ orders received in round ii if prices still followed the benchmark
equilibrium process in (15). Because hedgers’ orders are exogenous, the orders received by the
dealer at the start of round ii are still given by H1t = Ht + ⌘1t . The dealer can therefore estimate
Ht before the start of round-ii inter-dealer trading as E[Ht|⌦1t:ii] = Gdh( 1dHt + ⌘1t ). Recall that in
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Figure 3: Front-Running Model Timing		 	 		 	 	Round	II	 	 Dealers	quote	prices:	!":$$% 	
Hedgers	place	orders:	ℍ"'	Dealers	initiate	inter-dealer	trades:	(":$$% 	Dealers	fill	inter-dealer	orders:	)":$$% 	Dealers	observe	aggregate	order	flow:	*":$$ 		 	 	Round	III	 	 Dealers	quote	prices:	!":$$$% 	
Investors	place	orders:	,":$$$- 		Inter-dealer	Trade:	(":$$$% ,	)":$$$% 	Dealers	fill	investors’	and	hedgers’	orders	Dealers	observe	aggregate	order	flow:	*":$$$ 		 	 		 	 		
Notes: Modified timing of trades in Front-Running Model. Changes shown in bold type.
the benchmark equilibrium Ht shocks have no eﬀect on  St:iii because round-ii order flow only
reveals the value of Yt. So the advanced information on Ht contained in the hedgers’ orders has no
forecasting power for the near-term change in prices,  St:iii. In contrast, the advanced information
is useful in forecasting  St:iv because dealers incorporate the value of Ht revealed by round-iii order
flow when quoting prices at the start of round iv. In particular, the dealer’s forecast is now given
by
E[ St:iv|⌦1t:ii] = ⇤ivAt 1 + 1 ⇤ivE[Yt|⌦1t:ii] + 11  +r⇤E[Ht|⌦1t:ii].
As above, the dealer 1 initiates inter-dealer trades in round ii according to T 1t:ii = }1t:ii +
1
dE
⇥
Xt:ii|⌦1t:ii
⇤
+ O1t:i, so advanced information can aﬀect his trade by changing either the desired
position }1t:ii and/or expected order flow E
⇥
Xt:ii|⌦1t:ii
⇤
. Under the assumption that the dealer ig-
nores the eﬀects of his own trades on equilibrium order flow, the advanced information only aﬀects
the desired position. In particular, from (22a) the change in the desired position due to advanced
information is 11  +r 
d
ii|siv⇤E[Ht|⌦1t:ii]. In the benchmark equilibrium, dealers choose their round-ii
positions to hedge against future shocks with a positive value for the  dii|siv coeﬃcient. Consequently,
the eﬀect of advanced information that produces a positive value for E[Ht|⌦1t:ii] is to increase their
orders to purchase Forex from other dealers in round ii. In other words, the dealer will infer from
hedgers’ orders to purchase Forex that they should to aim to take a larger round-ii position as
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a hedge against the likelihood that dealers will quote higher round-iv prices to accommodate a
positive Ht shock.
This analysis illuminates several important points. First, the dealer uses the advanced informa-
tion about the hedgers’ Forex orders to “trade ahead” of those orders. Ceteris paribus, the dealer
initiates Forex purchases (sales) in inter-dealer trading when he knows that he must fill hedgers
Forex purchase (sales) orders in the future. Second, the incentive for dealers to front-run hedgers’
orders only arises here because dealers use to the information in those orders to better hedge against
future shocks. If dealers chose their round-ii positions without regard to hedging future shocks (i.e.,
if  1ii|siv = 0), advanced information on hedgers’ orders would have no eﬀect on their round-ii trading
decisions. Actual Forex dealers often refer to the front-running of external orders as “pre-hedging”;
apparently to suggest that their trades are aimed at reducing their own risks. The analysis here
provides some support for this view insofar as front-running only appears because the dealer aims
to better hedge against the price-impact of future shocks.
Finally, it is important to recognize that this is a partial equilibrium analysis of front-running
because I assumed that the change in the dealer’s round-ii trades had no eﬀect on the benchmark
equilibrium. This may be approximately true when there are a large number of dealers in the
market and the unilateral front-running by one dealer occurs without the knowledge of the others.
Under these special circumstances, front-running has no impact on other market participants and
the benefit to the dealer comes solely from enhanced hedging. Note that there is no increase in
dealers’ expected trading profit because the diﬀerence in their round-ii position is uncorrelated with
 St:iii. So the increase in the dealer’s expected utility from using advanced information arises from
a reduction in the conditional variance of their future wealth.
3.2 Multilateral Front-Running
Since there is a clear incentive for any dealer to unilaterally front-run, it is unreasonable to assume
that prices and order flows will continue to follow the benchmark equilibrium process when many
dealers have advanced knowledge of their hedgers’ orders. Rather, in equilibrium, round-ii order flow
will reflect the decisions of these dealers to front-run, which will, in turn, aﬀect the determination
of prices and order flows in subsequent trading rounds. I now examine the behavior of prices and
order flows in an equilibrium where all dealers receive advanced knowledge of their hedgers’ orders
in round ii.
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Theorem 2. In an eﬃcient risk-sharing equilibrium with multilateral front-running, overnight re-
turns and intraday price changes follow
Rt = ⇤iAt 1 + 1+rr Vt, (26a)
 St:ii = 0, (26b)
 St:iii = ⇤iiiAt 1 +  iii(Xt:ii   E[Xt:ii|It:ii]), and (26c)
 St:iv = ⇤ivAt 1 +  iv1(Xt:iii   E[Xt:iii|It:iii]) +  iv2(Xt:ii   E[Xt:ii|It:ii]), (26d)
for some coeﬃcients ⇤i and  i. Investors’ orders in rounds i and iii are given by
Ont:i =  yi Y nt +  ai At 1, and (27a)
Ont:iii =  yiiiY nt +  xiii(Xt:ii   E[Xt:ii|It:ii]) +  aiiiAt 1, (27b)
for some coeﬃcients  j. Unexpected order flows from inter-dealer trading in rounds ii and iii are
Xt:ii   E[Xt:ii|It:ii] =  yiiYt +  hiiHt, and (28a)
Xt:iii   E[Xt:iii|It:iii] =  yiiiYt +  hiiiHt, (28b)
for some coeﬃcients  yi and  hi , where It:j denotes dealers’ common information at the start of
round j.
Theorem 2 shows that multilateral front-running has far-reaching eﬀects on the behavior of
equilibrium prices, order flows and investors’ Forex orders. In this equilibrium, unexpected aggregate
order flows in rounds ii and iii depend on both the Yt and Ht shocks. As a consequence, while
dealers continue to use aggregate order flows to determine the prices to quote in rounds iii and iv,
these flows contain diﬀerent information about the underlying Yt and Ht shocks. So while (26c)
and (26d) link  St:iii and  St:iv to order flows, actual price changes are diﬀerent functions of
the underlying shocks than in the benchmark equilibrium. Multilateral front-running also aﬀects
investors’ orders. Equation (27a) shows that investors’ round-i orders take the same form as in
the benchmark equilibrium, but the coeﬃcients are quantitatively diﬀerent. In round iii, investors’
orders depend on individual income Y nt (rather than Yt) and on unexpected order flow from round
ii.
To understand the economics behind these equilibrium eﬀects, it is useful to again start with
the determination of round iv prices. In the benchmark equilibrium, order flows in rounds ii and
iii sequentially reveal the value of the Yt and Ht shocks so that dealers can quote a round-iv price
that achieves eﬃcient risk-sharing. This remains true in the front-running equilibrium, but dealers
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learn the value of the Yt and Ht shocks using the order flows from rounds ii and iii. Thus the price
dealers quote in round iv still takes the form shown in equation (18).
Front-running has more far-reaching eﬀects on dealers’ round-iii quotes because order flow in
round ii no longer reveals the value of Yt. The reason is that dealers’ front-running trades create an
information externality. Each dealer finds it optimal to initiate trades using their private estimates
of Yt and Ht, but these actions make aggregate order flow dependent on both shocks, so it is
impossible for dealers to precisely estimate either Yt or Ht from their observations on Xt:ii. Thus,
in comparison with the benchmark equilibrium, the information externality slows down the process
by which inter-dealer trading aggregates the information on Yt contained in investors’ orders.
The slowing down of information aggregation has several eﬀects on the equilibrium. First, the
price dealers quote in round iii depends on their common estimate of Yt, E[Yt|Xt:ii], rather than
its actual value. This means that uncertainty concerning Yt, and its impact on prices, is not fully
resolved until round iv, which is a period later in the benchmark equilibrium. Second, dealers also
base their round-iii quotes on their estimate of Ht, E[Ht|Xt:ii], because this ensures eﬃcient risk-
sharing. As a result, Ht shocks aﬀect round-iii prices, via their impact on E[Yt|Xt:ii] and E[Ht|Xt:ii].
This represents a new source of risk that investors will factor into their round-i orders. Third, the
impact of Ht shocks on round-iii prices creates a stronger incentive for dealers to front-run their
hedgers’ orders. Recall that there was only a hedging incentive to front-run when prices follow the
benchmark equilibrium process. In this equilibrium dealers also have a speculative incentive to front-
run because they have private information concerning Ht that will aﬀect  St;iii. This dependency
is similar to the “free-riding” feature of dealer front-running in Osler and Turnbull (2017).
Figure 4 provides more perspective on the front-running equilibrium. The figure plots the values
for the risk premia coeﬃcients, ⇤iii and ⇤iv, and the order flow coeﬃcients,  yii,  hii,  yiii, and  hiii
from the front-running and benchmark equilibria against investors’ gain coeﬃcient Gny (as in Figure
2). I compare the equilibria in the case where Gdh = 0.02 so hedgers’ orders provide dealers with
relatively imprecise information about Ht. All the other parameters are set to the values shown in
Table 1.
Panels A and B of Figure 4 compare the risk premia coeﬃcients across the two equilibria. To
interpret these plots, recall that E [ St:iii|It:i] = ⇤iiiAt 1 and E [ St:iv|It:i] = ⇤ivAt 1, so lower
values for the coeﬃcients imply smaller positive premia when dealers and investors collectively hold
long Forex positions. The plots in panels A and B show that font-running reduces the risk premium
required to hold long positions during rounds ii and iii. Recall that these premia provide the
compensation necessary to share risk eﬃciently across investors and dealers. In the front-running
equilibrium, dealers have advanced information on their hedgers’ orders, which reduces the risk
they face in round ii. At the same time, the information externality created by front-running makes
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Figure 4: Front-Running Equilibrium I
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 St:iii susceptible to Ht shocks, which increases the risk faced by investors. These forces push the
round ii premium in opposite directions, but on balance the eﬀects on dealers’ risk dominate. So,
as panel A shows, the premium is smaller than in the benchmark equilibrium. Panel B shows that
front-running significantly reduces the risk premium in round iii. In the benchmark equilibrium,
the risk premium primarily compensates investors for the risk associated with the impact of Ht
shocks on  St:iv. This risk is diminished in the front-running equilibrium because the change in
prices  St:iii provides investors with (imprecise) information on Ht.
The remaining panels in Figure 4 compare the order flow coeﬃcients in the front-running and
benchmark equilibria. The plots for  yii and  hii in panels C and D show that Yt and Ht shocks have
roughly opposite impacts on round-ii order flow in the front-running equilibrium. Eﬃcient risk-
sharing requires that prices in rounds iii and iv incorporate information on Yt Ht that dealers learn
from order flows in rounds ii and iii. So dealers initiate trades in round ii based on E[Yt  Ht|⌦dt:ii]
using the information on Yt from their round-i investors’ orders and information on Ht from their
pending hedgers’ orders. As a result, dealers have both a speculative and hedging motive to trade
in the same direction as their investor and hedgers’ orders. Positive Yt shocks that induce investors
to sell Forex to dealers across the market in round i produce negative order flow in inter-dealer
trading, as shown by the plot for  yii in panel C. Similarly, positive Ht shocks that produce pending
hedgers’ orders to purchase Forex from dealers across the market, produce positive order flow as
dealers “trade ahead” of their pending orders, so the values for  hii are positive as shown in panel
D. Notice, also, that both shocks have smaller impacts on order flow in equilibria where investors
have more precise information about income (i.e., in equilibria where Gny is larger). In these cases,
investors’ round-i orders contain a larger speculate component so dealers are more likely to find
themselves with large unwanted inventory positions that mitigate the impact of pending hedgers’
orders on their round-ii trades.
Finally, panels E and F show how front-running aﬀects the composition of order flow in round
iii. Because the information externality makes it impossible to precisely infer Yt or Ht from Xt:ii,
dealers still have an incentive to use their private estimates of Yt and Ht in their round-iii trading
strategies. As in round ii, this private information is aggregated into order flow via inter-dealer
trading. We see in panel E that Yt shocks have a positive impact on unexpected order flow via
this aggregation process. The plots for  hiii in panel F show that Ht shocks have a much larger
positive impact on order flow in the front-running equilibrium than in the benchmark equilibrium.
The reason is that round-ii order flow provides dealers with more precise information about Ht in
the front-running equilibrium so that their round-iii trades use this information more aggressively.
Figure 5 shows how front-running aﬀects the behavior of equilibrium prices. Recall that dealers
quote prices as part of their BNE strategies, so the price-impact of shocks varies with these strategies
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Figure 5: Front-Running Equilibrium II
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benchmark equilibrium (dot-dashed) against the investors gain, Gny ⇥100. All other
parameters are equal to the values in Table 1 with dealers’ gain Gdy set equal to
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across diﬀerent equilibria.6 Panel A plots the values for 11  +r⇤ in the front-running and benchmark
equilibria against the investors’ gain coeﬃcient Gny. These coeﬃcients identify the cumulative eﬀects
6This feature diﬀerentiates my analysis from earlier research on dual and strategic trading (cited above) in which
the price-impact of trade is specified exogenously.
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of Ht   Yt shocks on dealers’ quotes by round iv. The cumulative price eﬀects are approximately
two percent smaller in the front-running equilibrium because dealers and investors require smaller
risk premia to hold long intraday Forex positions, as discussed above.
The remaining panels in Figure 5 plot the price-impact coeﬃcients that measure how dealers’
revise their price quotes in response to unexpected order flow. The coeﬃcients  iii and  iv1 identify
how dealers revise their quotes at the start of rounds iii and iv in response to the unexpected
aggregate order flows they observe at the end of the previous rounds. These coeﬃcients are uniformly
positive, indicating the dealers revise their quotes upwards (downwards) in response to unexpected
positive (negative) flows. Panel B shows that the coeﬃcient  iii is much less sensitive to diﬀerences in
the precision of investors information (measured by Gny) than in the benchmark equilibrium. Because
Yt and Ht shocks have approximately symmetric impacts on round-ii order flows, dealers draw
similar inferences from their observations on these flows across diﬀerent values for Gny. By contrast,
the impact of Yt shocks on round-ii order flows varies with Gny in the benchmark equilibrium, so
dealers adjust their inferences. Panel C shows that the price-impact of round-iii order flow is
much smaller in the front-running than the benchmark equilibrium. In general, the price-impact
coeﬃcients depend on the incremental information carried by the flow. The price-impact coeﬃcient
is large in the benchmark equilibrium because the round-iii flow fully reveals the value of Ht, which
is important in determining the round-iv price level that shares risk eﬃciently. By contrast, in
the front-running equilibrium, the round-iii flow provides incremental information on Yt and Ht
that have opposite risk-sharing implications for round-iv prices. The plots in panel D show that
dealers also use the information in round-ii flows when quoting round-iv prices. These flows contain
information about the intraday risk premia embedded in round-iii prices that must be adjusted so
that round-iv prices share risk eﬃciently. These adjustments are very small in both the front-
running and benchmark equilibria.
To summarize, multilateral front-running has far-reaching eﬀects on the behavior of equilib-
rium prices and order flows. These eﬀects originate with the information externality induced by
front-running that alters the composition and price-impact of order flows, and the optimal trading
decisions of dealers and investors. I next examine how these eﬀects depend on the degree of collusion
among dealers
4 Front-Running with Collusion
To this point, I have considered the eﬀects of front-running in equilibria where the hedgers’ orders
received by each dealer contained relatively imprecise information about aggregate shocks. I now
analyze how the eﬀects of front-running change when dealers can make more precise inferences about
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aggregate shocks through the collusive sharing of information on hedgers’ orders. This analysis is
motivated by the many regulator reports (cited in the Introduction) that document how dealers at
major banks collusively shared information about their pending external orders.
To study the eﬀects of collusion, I assume that the d dealers in the market are split into equal
groups of size g. Dealers within each group share information on the hedgers’ orders they receive in
round ii before making their own trading decisions. To keep things simple, I assume that there is
no netting of hedgers’ orders among the dealers in each group, so collusion only involves the sharing
of information.
Recall that the hedgers’ orders received by dealer d are Hdt = 1dHt+⌘
d
t , where Ht is the aggregate
imbalance in hedgers’ orders and ⌘dt ⇠ N(0, 2⌘) is a distribution shock that allocates orders across
dealers. These shocks are negatively correlated across dealers with correlation ⇢ =   1d 1 to ensure
that
Pd
d=1 ⌘
d
t = 0. In the absence of collusion, each dealer’s estimate of Ht is based on their own
hedgers’ orders. But if a dealer is part of a collusive group with g members, they can obtain
a more precise estimate of Ht based on the net imbalance in the orders received by the group:
Hgt =
P
d2gHdt . Aggregating across dealers gives Hgt = gdHt + ⌘
g
t , where ⌘gt =
P
d2g ⌘
d
t is the group
distribution shock which has a mean of zero and variance equal to d gd 1g 
2
⌘. The estimate of Ht for
dealers in a group of size g is therefore
E[Ht|⌦gt:ii] = Ggh(Hgt   E[Hgt |It:ii]) = Ggh(
g
d
Ht + ⌘
g
t ), where Ggh =
g
d 
2
h
(gd)
2 2h +
d g
d 1g 2⌘
.
Dealers put more weight on the unexpected imbalance in the groups’ hedge orders Hgt as the size
of the group rises because the gain coeﬃcient Ggh is increasing in g. Since the distribution shocks
⌘dt are negatively correlated across dealers, aggregating orders across dealers in the group produces
a more precise signal on Ht, so the unexpected values for Hgt are given greater weight in dealers’
estimates.
Figure 6 illustrates how diﬀerent values for the group gain coeﬃcient Ggh aﬀect the front-running
equilibria. The figure plots the values for the risk premia coeﬃcients, ⇤iii and ⇤iv, and the order
flow coeﬃcients,  yii,  hii,  yiii, and  hiii in equilibria where Ggh = {0.02, 0.03, 0.04}. If we assumed that
the gain for an individual dealer is Gdh = 0.02, these values correspond to groups ranging between
one and 10 dealers. Since there are only a total of 20 dealers in model, these plots provide a good
indication of how large diﬀerences in the degree of collusion aﬀects the equilibria.
Figure 6 shows that collusion among dealers has a much larger impact on the composition of order
flows than on the intraday risk premia. In panels A and B, there are only small diﬀerences between
the risk premia coeﬃcients, ⇤iii and ⇤iv, across the three sets of equilibria. Collusion among dealers
reduces the risk they face in holding intraday positions, but it generally increases the risks investors
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Figure 6: Front-Running Equilibrium III
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
5
10
15
20
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
2
4
6
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1
2
3
4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
4
8
12
16
Notes: The figure plots coeﬃcients from the front-running equilibrium against the
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face as front-running makes round-iii prices susceptible to Ht shocks. The plots in panels A and
B show how these diﬀerent factors are reflected in the risk premia across equilibria with diﬀerent
degrees of dealer collusion and varying precision in investors’ information. Notice that greater
collusion either increases or reduces ⇤iii and ⇤iv depending on precision of investors’ information.
This non-monotonicity appears in other features of the front-running equilibria examined below.
The eﬀects of collusion on round-ii order flow are shown in panels C and D. When information
on hedgers’ orders is shared among a larger group of dealers, individual dealers face less risk from Ht
shocks. As a consequence, the dealers aim for round-ii positions }dt:ii that make more aggressive use
of their forecasts for  St:iii and  St:iv. Since these forecasts depend on the shared information in
hedgers orders and information contained in round-i investors’ orders, the trades initiated by each
colluding dealer in round ii become more dependent on external trades. In aggregate, this greater
dependency means that Yt shocks have a larger (negative) impact on (unexpected) order flow, as
shown in panel C. Similarly, the plots in panel D show that Ht shocks have a larger positive impact
on order flow when there is more collusion among dealers. Collusion also aﬀects the composition of
order flow in round iii. As in round ii, greater collusion leads dealers to make more aggressive use of
their forecasts for  St:iv. In this case, dealers use their shared information on hedgers orders, and
the information in the investor orders they individually received in rounds i and iii. In aggregate,
this makes round-iii order flow more susceptible to Yt and Ht shocks, as can be seen in panels E
and F.
In this model, hedgers’ orders are strictly exogenous so the orders received by each dealer do
not depend on whether they engage in unilateral or collusive front-running. In contrast, investors
choose their orders in rounds i and iii optimally, so the investor orders received by each dealer are
potentially impacted by the equilibrium price eﬀects of collusive front-running even though there is
no opportunity for a dealer to front-run their investor orders. Figure 7 provides information on this
market-wide eﬀect.
Theorems 1 and 2 showed that each investor’s round-i order follows Ont:i =  yi Y nt +  ai At 1.
Panels A and B of Figure 7 show how the  yi coeﬃcient varies with the investor’s gain coeﬃcient Gny
in the benchmark and front-running equilibria. Individual investors use the information in their own
foreign income Y nt to establish speculative round-i positions. When this information is imprecise,
the speculative positions are very small, so their orders simply hedge foreign income which makes
 yi close to  1. In equilibria where investors have more precise information, they use their round-
i orders to take larger speculative positions, which makes the  yi coeﬃcient more negative. The
plots in panel A and B show that investors’ orders have a smaller speculative component in the
front-running equilibria. In other words, investors establish smaller speculative positions in round i
when they recognize that dealers are front-running hedgers’ orders. Panel B also shows that there
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Figure 7: Investors’ Orders
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Notes: Panels A and B plot the income coeﬃcient for investors’ round-i orders. Panel C plots
the income coeﬃcient for investors’ round-iii orders in the benchmark and front-running equilibria.
Panel D plots the order flow coeﬃcient on investors’ round-iii orders in the front-running equilibria.
Solid, dashed and dot-dashed lines plot coeﬃcients from the front-running equilibria with the dealers’
gain Gdh equal to 0.02, 0.03 and 0.04, respectively. Dotted lines plot coeﬃcients from the benchmark
equilibria with Gdh = 0.02. All other parameters are equal to the values in Table 1
are negligible diﬀerences between the  yi coeﬃcients across front-running equilibria with diﬀerent
degrees of collusion. It appears that the presence of front-running rather than the degree of collusive
front-running has the greatest impact on investors’ willingness to take speculative round-i positions.
The lower panels of Figure 7 show how front-running and collusion aﬀect the determinants of
investors’ round-iii orders. In the benchmark equilibrium investors learn the value of Yt by the start
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of round iii, so Yt supplants Y nt as the determinant of their individual orders: Ont:iii =  yiiiYt+ aiiiAt 1.
Panel C shows that  yiii increases with the precision of investor’s information because under eﬃcient
risk sharing the intraday risk premium induces investors to hold longer Forex positions in round iii.
In the front-running equilibrium the information externality prevents investors from learning the
value of Yt by the start of round iii, so their orders depend on Y nt and round-ii order flow (which
they infer from  St:iii and At 1):
Ont:iii =  yiiiY nt +  xiii(Xt:ii   E[Xt:ii|It:ii]) +  aiiiAt 1.
The plots in Panel C show that the  yiii coeﬃcients are larger in the presence of front-running which
indicates that investors are more willing to take speculative positions in round iii based on the
private information in Y nt . This arises because Yt shocks contribute to unexpected order flow in
round-iii that dealers use to quote prices in round iv. Consequently, investors’ income Y nt has
forecasting power for  St:iv. In a sense, the information externality created by front-running shifts
investors’ speculative activity from round i to round iii. Panel D shows how the degree of collusion
aﬀects the dependency of investors’ orders on prior unexpected order flow, Xt:ii   E[Xt:ii|It:ii].
Investors use Xt:ii   E[Xt:ii|It:ii] to update their estimates of Yt and Ht, which in turn aﬀect their
forecasts for  St:iv and Rt+1. The plots show that the net eﬀect of the information conveyed by
positive order flow is that investors increase their purchases of Forex in order to establish larger long
speculative positions. This eﬀect is larger when investors have more precise private information on
Yt and when the degree of collusion is lower because in both instances the incremental information
conveyed by order flow is diminished.
These results show that the degree of collusive front-running primarily aﬀects the composition
of equilibrium order flows and the determinants of investors’ orders. However, all in all, it appears
that equilibrium trading patterns are aﬀected more by the presence of front-running than by the
degree to which dealers engage in collusive front-running.
5 Front-Running, Collusion and Trading Profits
To this point my analysis has focused on how front-running and collusion aﬀect the behavior of
equilibrium prices, orders flows, and external orders. In this section, I examine how front-running
impacts dealers’ and investors’ welfare. Clearly, as part of a BNE strategy, individual dealers must
benefit from front-running given the trading decisions of other dealers. However, since front-running
creates an information externality, it is much less clear how dealers’ welfare compares between the
benchmark and the front-running equilibria. Furthermore, if dealers are better oﬀ in the front-
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running equilibrium, is this because they make more profitable trades with hedgers, investors, or
both? In other words, do dealers benefit from front-running at the expense of just hedgers (i.e. the
counter-parties in the front-run orders), or at the expense of both hedgers and investors?
To address these questions, it is useful to examine the equilibrium dynamics of investors’ and
dealers’ wealth. In the case of investors, the budget constraints in (4) can be rewritten as
Wnt+1:i = A
n
t:ivRt+1 + (1 + r) {Wnt:i + St:iY nt }+ (1 + r)
 
Ant 1:iv(St:iv   St:i)
 
+⇧nt , (29a)
where ⇧nt = (1 + r) {(Ont:iii +Ont:i) St:iv +Ont:i St:iii} . (29b)
Equation (29a) decomposes next day’s wealth into four components: the excess return on the
overnight Forex position, Ant:ivRt+1; the return on prior wealth and foreign income (1 + r) ⇥
{Wnt:i + St:iY nt }; the intraday capital gain on prior Forex holdings, (1 + r)
 
Ant 1:iv(St:iv   St:i)
 
;
and intraday trading profits, ⇧nt . Because investors hold identical overnight positions in the bench-
mark and front-running equilibria, in aggregate these positions equal the entire stock of Forex so
At =
´ 1
0 A
n
t:ivdn = A
n
t:iv for all n. The overnight return and intraday capital gain components are
therefore identical across investors. Equation (29b) shows how trading profits are determined by
the intraday capital gains on positions the investor establishes through their orders in rounds i and
iii.
In the case of dealers, the budget constraints in (9) can be rewritten as
W dt+1:i = (1 + r)W
d
t:i +⇧
d
t , (30a)
where ⇧dt = (1 + r)
n
(}dt:iii   ⇠dt:iii) St:iv + (}dt:ii   ⇠dt:ii) St:iii  Odt:i St:ii
o
. (30b)
Since dealers do not hold Forex overnight in any equilibria, next day’s wealth depends on just prior
wealth and the dealer’s trading profits, ⇧dt . Equation (30b) shows how these profits depend on the
intraday capital gains dealers obtain on their end-of-round Forex positions. For example, dealers
have a position of  Odt:i at the end of round i after filling the investors’ orders they receive of Odt:i.
Each dealer’s position at the end of rounds ii and iii depends on their desired position and the
unexpected orders they must fill from other dealers, }dt:j   ⇠dt:j . Notice that the hedgers’ orders and
investors’ round-iii orders received by dealer d aﬀect profits via their impact on desired positions
}dt:j , whereas the external orders received by all dealers aﬀect positions via unexpected inter-dealer
orders ⇠dt:j , and price changes  St:j .
The trading profits of investors and dealers are linked by the market clearing conditions. In
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particular, combining (29b), (30b) with (10) - (13), we find that the trading profits of all dealers
are
⇧dt ⌘
dX
d=1
⇧dt =  (1 + r) {(Ot:iii +Ot:i) St:iv +Ot:i St:iii}  (1 + r)(Ht St:iv), (31)
where Ot:j and Ht are the aggregate imbalances in orders from investors and hedgers. The first
term on the right-hand-side is equal to minus one times the aggregate trading profits of investors:
  ´ 10 ⇧nt dn, while the second term identifies the cost of filling hedgers’ orders: Ct = (1+r)(Ht St:iv).
These costs are equal to the capital gain the dealers would have captured if they had filled hedgers’
orders at the round-iv price rather than the round-iii price. Equation (31) shows that any increase
in the aggregate trading profits of dealers caused by front-running must either come from a fall in
investors’ trading profits
´ 1
0 ⇧
n
t dn, and/or a reduction in the hedge order costs Ct.
Figure 8 shows how trading profits and costs are distributed across investors and dealers in the
benchmark equilibrium. Panel A plots the return investors expect on their overnight and intraday
positions E[Ant:ivRt+1 + (1 + r)
 
Ant 1:iv(St:iv   St:i)
 
] against the investor gain coeﬃcient Gny for
two values of the dealers’ gain: Gdh = {0.02, 0.04}. Expected overnight returns are unaﬀected by
the precision of either investors’ or dealers’ information because under complete risk sharing the
overnight risk premia only reflects investors’ preferences. Thus the plots in Panel A show that the
precision of investors’ and dealers’ information have some impact on the expected capital gains on
intraday positions (i.e., E[(1 + r)
 
Ant 1:iv(St:iv   St:i)
 
), but the eﬀects are very small. Panel B
shows that investors’ information has a much larger impact on their expected trading profits, E[⇧nt ].
Expected trading profits increase proportionately with the gain coeﬃcient Gny because investors
willingness to take speculative positions with their round-i orders critically depends on the precision
of their information concerning Yt. When investors have more precise information, they are willing
to take larger speculative positions which, in expectation, produce greater trading profits. Notice,
also, that investors’ expected trading profits are not materially aﬀected by the precision of dealers’
information. Panel B plots E[⇧nt ] against Gny for Gdh = {0.02, 0.04}, but the two plotted lines are
indistinguishable. The lower panels of Figure 8 show how the precision of information aﬀects dealer
welfare. Panel C plots expected trading losses across all dealers,  E[⇧dt ] , which mirror investors’
expected profits in panel B. Panel D shows the expected hedge cost E[Ct] as a fraction of expected
trading losses,  E[⇧dt ]. Providing liquidity to hedgers adds approximately 23 percent to dealers’
overall expected losses. The plots in panel D are similar in shape to those in panel A because E[Ct]
depends on the size of the intraday round-iii risk premia.
Figure 8 shows that dealers’ expected losses are minimally aﬀected by the gain coeﬃcient Gdh.
One might have anticipated that dealers’ losses would be smaller when they have more precise
information on the aggregate imbalance in hedgers orders because they would have been willing to
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Figure 8: Benchmark Profits and Costs
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Notes: Panel A plots the return investors expect on their overnight and intraday positions
E[Ant:ivRt+1+(1+r)
 
Ant 1:iv(St:iv   St:i)
 
]. Panel B plots investors’ expected trading profits, E[⇧nt ].
Panels C and D plot the expected dealer loss  E[⇧dt ] and the ratio of the expected hedge order costs
to the expect loss,  E[Ct]/E[⇧dt ], respectively. All variables multiplied by 1000 and plotted against
the investor gain coeﬃcient, Gny ⇥ 100. Each panel contains solid and dashed lines from the bench-
mark equilibria with the dealers’ gain Gdh equal to 0.02 and 0.04, respectively (but the lines are only
distinguishable in panels A and D). All other parameters are equal to the values in Table 1
take more aggressive speculative positions. However, in the benchmark equilibrium greater precision
only directly impacts inter-dealer trading in round iii. Consequently, it aﬀects the distribution of
trading profits across dealers, but not the expected aggregate profit. One important implication
of this result is that the collusive sharing of information about hedgers’ orders does not materially
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Figure 9: Front-Running Profits and Costs
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Notes: Panel A plots the return investors expect on their overnight and intraday positions
E[Ant:ivRt+1+(1+r)
 
Ant 1:iv(St:iv   St:i)
 
]. Panel B plots investors’ expected trading profits, E[⇧nt ].
Panels C and D plot the expected dealer loss  E[⇧dt ] and the expect cost of filling hedgers’ orders
E[Ct]. All variables are plotted as fractions of the corresponding value in the benchmark equilibrium
(with Gdh = 0.02) against the investor gain coeﬃcient, Gny ⇥ 100. Solid, dashed and dot-dashed lines
plot coeﬃcients from the front-running equilibria with Ggh equal to 0.02, 0.03 and 0.04, respectively.
improve aggregate dealer profits when dealers are unable to front-run the orders. Information-
sharing does have some influence on the size of intraday risk premia and expected hedge costs,
but these eﬀects are very small when compared to investors’ expected trading profits. So, in sum,
collusive information-sharing without front-running doesn’t appear to materially lower investors’
expected returns and trading profits.
39
The eﬀects of front-running on returns, trading profits, and costs are illustrated in Figure 9.
Panel A shows investors’ expected returns in the front-running equilibria as a fraction of expected
returns in the benchmark equilibria (with Gdh = 0.02) from collusive front-running equilibria where
Ggh = {0.02, 0.03, 0.04}. The figure shows that front-running lowers expected returns by a little more
than two percent (depending on the value for the investors’ gain Gny) across equilibria with diﬀerent
degrees of collusion. These eﬀects primarily reflect the impact of front-running on the intraday risk
premia. Panel B plots investors’ expected trading profits in the front-running equilibria as a fraction
of profits in the benchmark equilibria. In this case, front-running reduces expected profits between
approximately two and ten percent. Investors are most adversely aﬀected by front-running in cases
where they have more precise information about foreign income, measured by large values for Gny.
By comparison, the impact of front-running on investors’ profits is only minimally aﬀected by the
degree of collusion.
The lower panels of Figure 9 show how front-running impacts dealers’ expected losses. Panel C
plots expected losses for all dealers in the collusive font-running equilibria as a fraction of expected
losses in the benchmark equilibrium. The plot shows that front-running produces sizable reductions
in dealers’ losses ranging from approximately 20 to 12 percent. Front-running benefits dealers most
when investors have very imprecise information about foreign income. Under these circumstances,
investors’ round-i orders have a smaller speculative component, so dealers are less likely to find
themselves with a large unwanted position that inhibits their willingness to front-run their pending
hedgers’ orders in round ii. Front-running also significantly lowers the expected cost of providing
liquidity to hedgers, E[C]. Panel D plots E[C] in the three front-running equilibria as a fraction of
the expected cost in the benchmark equilibria. The plots show that front-running almost eliminates
these costs unless investors have very imprecise information, and even then the costs fall by over 90
percent.
Two aspects of these findings are particularly noteworthy. First, front-running by dealers has
an adverse eﬀect on all other market participants. As I noted in the introduction, the standard
view of regulators and legal plaintiﬀs is that dealer front-running primarily harms the entity that
submits the front-run order; i.e., the hedgers in this model. In contrast, the results above show that
front-running can have significant adverse eﬀects on investors’ trading profits even through dealers
had no opportunity to front-run investors’ orders. Second, information-sharing among dealers has
rather minor welfare eﬀects in the front-running equilibria. Figures 6 and 7 showed that aggregate
order flows and investors’ trades varied significantly across equilibria with diﬀerent values for Ggh,
but the plots in Figure 9 are very similar. It appears that the presence or absence of front-running
has much larger welfare implications than the degree to which dealers collusively front-run external
orders.
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To understand why front-running adversely aﬀects investors’ trading profits, it is useful to con-
sider the source of these profits in the benchmark equilibrium. Figure 7 showed that investors’
round-i trades had a larger speculative component when they had more precise private information
on Yt. On average these positions generate trading profits on investors’ round-i trades as the infor-
mation on Yt is aggregated by inter-dealer trading and incorporated into round-iii prices, and these
profits are higher in expectation when investors take larger speculative positions (see Figure 8). By
round iii, investors’ private information makes no contribution to their trading profits because the
value of Yt can be inferred from public information. So their round-iii trades are simply used to
establish a position that benefits from the intraday risk premium. Front-running reduces investors’
expected trading profits through two channels. First, it makes investors less willing to take spec-
ulative positions based on their own private information in round i. Second, the dependency of
investors’ round iii orders on round-ii order flow creates a problem of “rational confusion” (see, e.g.,
Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2008). Investors cannot diﬀerentiate between the eﬀects of Yt and Ht
shocks on order flow, so inevitably their round-iii orders contain “mistakes” that were missing in
the benchmark equilibrium.
Front-running also eﬀects the prices hedgers pay to fill their orders. In all equilibria, positive Ht
shocks raise the price dealers quote in round iv to ensure eﬃcient risk-sharing, but in the presence
of front-running, positive Ht shocks also raise prices in round iii via their impact on order flow.
Consequently, positive Ht shocks not only increase hedgers’ net orders to purchase Forex, but also
raise the price hedgers pay in aggregate to have those orders filled. Similarly, negative Ht shocks
reduce round-iii prices in the front-running equilibrium and increase the net sales of Forex by
hedgers, so front-running reduces the prices hedgers receive in aggregate for their net Forex sales.
Clearly, these eﬀects of front-running benefit dealers. In particular, they contribute to dealers’
trading profits by reducing the capital gains that are missed when hedgers’ orders are filled at the
round-iii price rather than the round-iv price.
Finally, let us turn to the eﬀects of collusion. The plots in Figure 9 shows that collusive front-
running harms investors marginally more than unilateral front-running, but it is the existence of
front-running that does most of the harm. The reason is that front-running with or without collusion
creates the information externality that fundamentally changes the behavior of Forex prices and
order flows. In the absence of front-running, collusion between dealers doesn’t change the process
by which the information contained in order flow is embedded into prices, so its eﬀects on investors
and hedgers are very small.
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6 Conclusion
The analysis in this paper shows that front-running aﬀects the behavior of Forex prices and or-
der flows in ways that impact all market-participants. These market-wide eﬀects appear because
front-running creates an externality that slows down the aggregation of information by inter-dealer
trading. Hitherto, regulators and plaintiﬀs have focused on how front-running directly aﬀects the
counter-parties in front-run trades, but my analysis shows that this perspective is too narrow. Front-
running directly benefits dealers by shifting the cost of providing liquidity to their counter-parties
(i.e. hedgers), but it also harms investors that have no direct involvement in the front-running trades
because they are less willing to take speculative positions based on their own private price-relevant
information. This collateral harm to investors may be more empirically significant than the direct
harm suﬀered by dealers’ counter-parties because front-running trades likely represent a very small
fraction of all trades in the market.
Many regulator reports highlight the fact that Forex dealers at several major banks used elec-
tronic chat rooms to share information on their inventory positions and customer orders. My
analysis shows that while the sharing of information on customer orders has equilibrium eﬀects
that impact all participants, in and of itself, such information-sharing has relatively minor eﬀects
on welfare. As a result, the welfare implications of unilateral and collusive front-running are quite
similar. However, this finding comes with a caveat. My analysis focuses on equilibria in which
information-sharing occurs symmetrically across all dealers. Collusive front-running may have dif-
ferent equilibrium implications when some dealers share information on pending customer orders
while others keep their customer order information confidential. I leave this as a topic for future
research.
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Appendix
This appendix provides the derivations of key equations in the text and the proofs of the Theorems
1 and 2.
A.1 Derivations
The following lemma is used to derive the equations for investors’ and dealers’ optimal Forex holdings
in (19) and (22):
Lemma. Let Z = {(a) +⌥0X +X 0⌅X , where X is a k ⇥ 1 vector of normally distributed random
variables with zero means and covariance ⌃. ⌅ is a symmetric k ⇥ k matrix, ⌥ is a k ⇥ 1 vector
function of the scalar a and {(a) is a function of a. Provided that ⇥ = I   2⌅⌃ is positive definite,
U = Eexp(Z) = |⇥| 1/2 exp    +⌥0µ+ 12⌥0⇥ 1⌃⌥  . (A.32)
Diﬀerentiating U with respect to a gives the following first order condition
@{
@a
+
@⌥
@a
⇣
1
2
⇣
⇥ 1⌃+
⇥
⇥ 1⌃
⇤0⌘
⌥
⌘
= 0, (A.33)
where @⌥@a = [
@⌥1
@a ,
@⌥2
@a , ...].
Derivation of Equation (19)
Consider investor n’s choice for Ant:iv in round iv. In both the benchmark and front-running equilib-
ria, overnight returns are Rt+1 = ⇤iAt+ 1+rr Vt+1. Since Vt+1 is a normal random variable and At is
know to investors by round iv, Rt+1 is normally distributed conditional on information, ⌦nt:iv. Choos-
ing Ant:iv to maximize expected utility Unt:iv subject to (4b) is therefore equivalent to maximizing
E[Ant:ivRt+1|⌦nt:iv]  12!V[Ant:ivRt+1|⌦nt:iv]. The resulting first-order condition implies that
Ant:iv = ⇥
n
iv|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:iv], with ⇥niv|r =
1
!V[Rt+1|⌦ivn,t]
(A.34)
as shown in (19c).
In round i the investor chooses Ant:i to maximize E
⇥ ! exp( !Wnt+1:i)|⌦nt:i⇤ subject to (4). In
both the benchmark and front-running equilibria, intraday price changes and overnight returns are
linear functions of normally distributed random variables, so applying the Lemma, the investor’s
problem is equivalent to minimizing  U in (A.32), with
Z =  !Wnt+1:i = { +  0X + X 0⌅X ,
{ =  !(1 + r) ⇥(Wnt:i + St:iY nt ) +Ain,tE[St:iii   St:i|⌦nt:i] + E[Ant:iii|⌦nt:i]E[ St:iv|⌦nt:i]⇤
  !E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:i]E[Rt+1|⌦nt:i],
⌥ =
26666664
 !(1 + r)E[ St:iv|⌦nt:i]
 !E[Rt+1|⌦nt:i]
 !E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:i]
 !(1 + r)Ant:i
 !(1 + r)E[Ant:iii|⌦nt:i]
37777775 , X =
26666664
U[Ant:iii|⌦nt:i]
U[Ant:iv|⌦nt:i]
U[Rt+1|⌦nt:i]
U[ St:iii|⌦nt:i]
U[ St:iv|⌦nt:i]
37777775 ,
and ⌅ =
26666664
0 0 0 0  !(1 + r)
0 0  ! 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
37777775 , (A.35)
where U[ |⌦nt:j ] =   E[ |⌦nt:j ] for any variable  . The first-order condition for Ant:i is
0 =  !(1 + r)Ent:i(St:iii   St:i) +
h
0 0 0  !(1 + r) 0
i ⇥
 iij
⇤
26666664
 !(1 + r)E[ St:iv|⌦nt:i]
 !E[Rt+1|⌦nt:i]
 !E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:i]
 !(1 + r)Ant:i
 !(1 + r)E[Ant:iii|⌦nt:i]
37777775 ,
with
h
 iij
i
= 12
⇣
(I   2⌅⌃) 1⌃+ ⇥(I   2⌅⌃) 1⌃⇤0⌘ and ⌃ = V[X|⌦nt:i], where X and ⌅ are defined
in (A.35). It proves convenient to rewrite this equation as
h
1   i14!(1 + r)
i " E[St:iii   St:i|⌦nt:i]
E[ St:iv|⌦nt:i]
#
=
!(1 + r)
h
 i44  
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h
 i24  
i
34
i " E[Rt+1|⌦nt:i]
E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:i]
#
. (A.36)
In round iii the investor chooses Ant:iii to minimizing  U in (A.32), with Z =  !Wnt+1:i =
A.1
{ +  0X + X 0⌅X ,
{ =  ! [(1 + r)Ant:iiiE[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii] + E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:iii]E[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii]] ,
⌥ =
264  !E[Rt+1|⌦
n
t:iii]
 !E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:iii]
 !(1 + r)Ant:iii
375 , X =
264 U[A
n
t:iv|⌦nt:iii]
U[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii]
U[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii]
375 , and ⌅ =
264 0  ! 00 0 0
0 0 0
375 ,
(A.37)
The first order condition for Ant:iii is
0 =  !(1 + r)E[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii] +
h
0 0  !(1 + r)
i ⇥
 iiiij
⇤ 264  !E[Rt+1|⌦
n
t:iii]
 !E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:iii]
 !(1 + r)Ant:iii
375 ,
with
h
 iiiij
i
= 12
⇣
(I   2⌅⌃) 1⌃+ ⇥(I   2⌅⌃) 1⌃⇤0⌘ and ⌃ = V[X|⌦nt:iii] where X and ⌅ are
defined in (A.37). Again, it is convenient to rewrite this equation as
E[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii] = !(1 + r) iii33Ant:iii + !
h
 iii13  
iii
23
i " E[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii]
E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:iii]
#
. (A.38)
To find investors round i position, we take expectations conditional on ⌦nt,i on both sides of this
equation and combine the result with (A.36) to give"
1  !(1 + r) i14
0 1
#"
E[St:iii   St:i|⌦nt:i]
E[ St:iv|⌦nt:i]
#
=
!(1 + r)
"
 i44  
i
45
0  iii33
#"
Ant:i
E[Ant:iii|⌦nt:i]
#
+ !
"
 i24  
i
34
 iii13  
iii
23
#"
E[Rt+1|⌦nt:i]
E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:i]
#
.
Using the fact that E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:i] = ⇥niv|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:i], from (A.34) we can rewrite this expression as
"
Ant:i
E[Ant:iii|⌦nt:i]
#
= 1!(1+r)
"
 i44  
i
45
0  iii33
# 1
⇥
 "
1  !(1 + r) i14
0 1
#"
E[St:iii   St:i|⌦nt:i]
E[ St:iv|⌦nt:i]
#
  !
"
 i24 + 
i
34⇥
n
iv|r
 iii13 + 
iii
23⇥
n
iv|r
#
E[Rt+1|⌦nt:i]
!
.
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The first row of this matrix equation gives the equation for Ant:i shown in (19a).
To find investors round iii position, we combine (A.38) with the fact that E[Ant:iv|⌦nt:iii] =
⇥niv|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii] from (A.34) to give
Ant:iii =
1
!(1 + r) iii33
E[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii] 
 iii13 + 
iii
23⇥
n
iv|r
(1 + r) iii33
E[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii],
as shown in equation (19b).
Derivation of Equation (22)
In round iii, dealers choose }dt:iii to maximize Udt:iii with information ⌦dt:iii. In both the benchmark
and front-running equilibria, the dealers’ budget constraint becomes
W dt+1:i = (1 + r)
h
W id,t   Zdt:i St:ii + (}dt:ii   ⇠dt:ii) St:iii + (}dt:iii   ⇠dt:iii) St:iv
i
.
By Lemma, choosing }dt:iii to maximize  E[exp( ✓W dt+1:i)|⌦dt:iii] is equivalent to minimizing  U in
(A.32), with Z =  !W dt+1:i = { +⌥0X + X 0⌅X , where
{ =  !(1 + r)
h
W dt:iii + }
d
t:iiiE[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii]
i
⌥ =
"
!(1 + r)E[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii]
 !(1 + r)}dt:iii
#
, X =
"
⇠dt:iii
U[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii]
#
, and ⌅ =
"
0 !(1 + r)
0 0
#
.
(A.39)
The first order condition for }dt:iii is
 !(1 + r)E[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii] +
h
0  !(1 + r)
i "  iii11  iii21
 iii21  
iii
22
#"
!(1 + r)E[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii]
 !(1 + r)}dt:iii
#
= 0,
with
h
 iiiij
i
= 12
⇣
(I   2⌅⌃) 1⌃+ ⇥(I   2⌅⌃) 1⌃⇤0⌘ and ⌃ = V[X|⌦dt:iii] where X and ⌅ are
defined in (A.39). This expression simplifies to
}dt:iii =  
d
iii|sivE[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii] where  diii|siv =
1 + !(1 + r) iii21
!(1 + r) iii22
,
as shown in (22b).
In round ii, dealers choose }dt:iito minimizing  U in (A.32), with Z =  !W dt+1:i = { + ⌥0X +
A.3
X 0⌅X , where
{ =  !(1 + r)
h
W dt:iii + }
d
t:iiE[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii] + E[}dt:iii|⌦dt:ii]E[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii]
i
,
⌥ =
266664
!(1 + r)E[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii]
 !(1 + r)}dt:ii
 !(1 + r)E[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii]
 !(1 + r)E[}dt:iii|⌦dt:ii]
377775 , X =
266664
⇠dt:ii
U[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii]
U[}dt:iii   ⇠dt:iii|⌦dt:ii]
U[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii]
377775 , and
⌅ =
266664
0 !(1 + r) 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0  !(1 + r)
0 0 0 0
377775 . (A.40)
The first order condition for }dt:ii is
0 =  !(1 + r)E[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii] +
h
0  !(1 + r) 0 0
i ⇥
 iii,j
⇤
266664
!(1 + r)E[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii]
 !(1 + r)}dt:ii
 !(1 + r)E[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii]
 !(1 + r)E[}dt:iii|⌦dt:ii]
377775 ,
with
h
 iiij
i
= 12
⇣
(I   2⌅⌃) 1⌃+ ⇥(I   2⌅⌃) 1⌃⇤0⌘ and ⌃ = V[X|⌦dt:iii] where X and ⌅ are defined
in (A.40). Simplifying this expression using the fact that E[}dt:iii|⌦dt:ii] =  diii|sivE[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii] gives
}dt:ii =
✓
1
!(1 + r) ii22
+
 ii21
 ii22
◆
E[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii] +
✓
1   
ii
24
 ii22
◆
 diii|siv  
 ii23
 ii22
 
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii],
as shown in (22a).
Dealer Price Quotes
Since dealers simultaneously quote prices at the start of each round, and prices are good for orders
of any size, all dealers must quote the same price to avoid the expected utility loss associated
with arbitrage. This means that equilibrium prices can only be a function of dealers common
information at the start of each trading round, It,j =
T
d Idt,j . This restriction allows us to derived
the following equations for prices from the market clearing and eﬃcient risk-sharing that apply in
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both the benchmark and front-running equilibria:
St:i = St:ii (A.41a)
St:ii = E [St:iii|It:ii] +  ii|siv ii|siiiE [ St:iv|It:ii] +
1
 ii|siii
E [Zt:i| It:ii] (A.41b)
St:iii = E [St:iv |It:iii] + 1 iii|sivE [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii] (A.41c)
St:iv =
1
1+rE[St+1:i + Pt+1|It:iv]  1(1+r)⇥iv|rE [At|It:iv] (A.41d)
where  j|i =
Pd
d=1 
d
j|i and ⇥i|j =
´ 1
0 ⇥
n
i|jdn.
To derive these equations, first note that in an eﬃcient risk sharing equilibrium, investors hold
the entire stock of Forex in round iv, so
At =
ˆ 1
0
Ant:ivdn =
ˆ 1
0
⇥niv|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:iv]dn.
Dealers’ common information It:iv is a subset of investors information ⌦nt:iv, so applying the Law of
Iterated expectations
E [At|It:iv] =
✓ˆ 1
0
⇥niv|rdn
◆
E[Rt+1|It:iv]. (A.42)
Combining this equation with the definition of overnight returns, gives (A.41d).
In round iii, market clearing implies
Xt:iii =
Xd
d=1
}dt:iii +
1
d
Xd
d=1
E
h
Xt:iii|⌦dt:iii
i
+Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i. (A.43)
Substituting for }dt:iii from (22b), taking expectations conditioned on It:iii, and simplifying gives
0 =  iii|sivE [ St:iv |It:iii] + E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii] , (A.44)
where  iii|siv =
Pd
d=1 
d
iii|siv . Rearranging this equation using the fact that  St:iv = St:iv   St:iii,
produces (A.41c).
In round ii, market clearing implies
Xt:ii =
Xd
d=1
}dt:ii +
1
d
Xd
d=1
E
h
Xt:ii|⌦dt:ii
i
+Ot:i. (A.45)
As above, we substitute for }dt:ii from (22a), take expectations conditioned on It:ii and simplify to
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obtain
0 =  ii|siiiE[ St:iii|It:ii] +  ii|sivE[ St:iv|It:ii] + E [Zt:i|It:ii] , (A.46)
where  ii|siii =
Pd
d=1 
d
ii|siii and  ii|siv =
Pd
d=1 
d
ii|siv . Rearranging this equation produces (A.41b).
Finally, dealers quote the same price in rounds i and ii to eliminate the risk of capital losses
from filling investors’ round-i orders. These losses arise from the (Adt 1:iv Odt:i) St:ii term in (9a).
This is feasible because there is no change in dealers’ common information between the start of
rounds iand ii.
Risk Premia
In both the benchmark and front-running equilibria, dealers’ observations on Xt:ii and Xt:iii are
suﬃcient to reveal the values of Yt and Ht by the start of round iv, so dealers’ estimates of At
are E[At|It:iv] =
P1
j=0(Yt j   Ht j) = At. Combining this result with (A.42) gives the following
equation for the overnight risk premium
E[Rt+1|It:iv] = ⇥ 1iv|rAt = ⇤iAt,
as shown in (24).
The first step in determining the intraday risk premia is to identify aggregate investors’ orders.
Combining the definitionsOnt:i ⌘ Ant:i Ant 1:iv Y nt andOnt:iii ⌘ Ant:iii Ant:i with (19) and aggregating,
gives
Ot:i =
ˆ 1
0
n
⇥ni|siiiE[ St:iii|⌦nt:i] +⇥ni|sivE[ St:iv|⌦nt:i] +⇥ni|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:i]
o
dn At 1   Yt,
(A.47a)
Ot:iii +Ot:i =
ˆ 1
0
n
⇥niii|sivE[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii] +⇥niii|RE[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii]
o
dn At 1   Yt. (A.47b)
To find the round iii premium, E [ St:iv|It:i], we take expectations on both sides of (A.47b)
E [Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:i] = ⇥iii|sivE[ St:iv|It:i] +⇥iii|RE[Rt+1|It:i] At 1   E [Yt| It:i] ,
=
 
⇥iii|siv⇤iv +⇥iii|R⇤i   1
 
At 1, (A.48)
where ⇥iii|siv =
´ 1
0 ⇥
n
iii|sivdn and ⇥iii|R =
´ 1
0 ⇥
n
iii|Rdn. Notice that E [Yt| It:i] = 0 because Yt is an
i.i.d. mean-zero variable and dealers have no information about the realization of Yt at the start of
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round i. Next, we take expectations of (A.44) conditioned It:i to give
0 =  iii|sivE [ St:iv |It:i] + E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:i] . (A.49)
Since dealers have no common information at the start of round i about the Ht shock, E [Ht| It:i] =
(1    )At 1. Combining this condition with (A.48), (A.49) and the definition, E [ St:iv|It:i] =
⇤ivAt 1, gives
0 =
⇥
 iii|siv⇤iv +
 
⇥iii|siv⇤iv +⇥iii|R⇤i   1
 
+ 1   ⇤At 1.
This condition must hold for all values of At 1, so
⇤iv =
 (1  ⇤i⇥iii|R)
 iii|siv +⇥iii|siv
,
as shown in (25b).
To find the round ii premium, E [ St:iii|It:i], we take expectations on both sides of (A.47a)
E [Ot:i| It:i] = ⇥i|siiiE[ St:iii|It:i] +⇥i|sivE[ St:iv|It:i] +⇥i|rE[Rt+1|It:i] At 1   E [Yt| It:i] ,
= ⇥i|siii⇤iiiAt 1 +⇥i|siv⇤ivAt 1 +⇥i|r⇤iAt 1  At 1,
where ⇥i|siii =
´ 1
0 ⇥
n
i|siiidn, ⇥i|siv =
´ 1
0 ⇥
n
i|sivdn and ⇥i|r =
´ 1
0 ⇥
n
i|rdn. We then combine this equation
with the expectation of (A.46)
0 =  ii|siiiE[ St:iii|It:i] +  ii|sivE[ St:iv|It:i] + E [Zt:i|It:i] ,
to give
0 =
⇥
 ii|siii⇤iii +  ii|siv⇤iv +
 
⇥i|siii⇤iii +⇥i|siv⇤iv +⇥i|r⇤i   1
 ⇤
At 1.
As above, the term in [.] must equal zero, which implies that
⇤iii =
1 ⇥i|r⇤i 
 ii|siii +⇥i|siii
 
✓
 ii|siv +⇥i|siv
 ii|siii +⇥i|siii
◆
⇤iv,
as shown in (25a).
A.7
Returns and Intraday Price Changes
In both the benchmark and front-running equilibria, intraday price changes and overnight returns
implied by dealers’ quotes are given by
Rt = ⇤iAt 1 + 1+rr Vt, (A.50a)
 St:iii = ⇤iiiAt 1   1r⇤(E[At|It:iii]  E[At|It:ii]), (A.50b)
+  1iii|siv {E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii]} ,
 St:iv = ⇤ivAt 1   1r⇤(At   E[At|It:iii])
=    1iii|siv {E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii]} . (A.50c)
To derive these equations, we first identify the prices dealers quote in round iv. (25a) and
(A.41d) imply that E [St+1:iv   St+1:i|It:iv] = (⇤iv + ⇤iii)E [At|It:iv]. Combining this expression
with (25a) and iterating forward gives
St:iv =
1X
i=1
⇣
1
1+r
⌘i
E[Pt+1   ⇤At+i 1|It:iv], (A.51)
where ⇤ = ⇤i + ⇤iii + ⇤iv. Substituting for the Pt process from (2) and the At process from (14),
(A.51) simplifies to
St:iv =
1
rFt   ⇤1  +rAt. (A.52)
By definition, St:i = E [St:iv |It:i]  (⇤iv + ⇤iii)At 1, so substituting for St:iv gives
St:i =
1
r
Pt  
h
 
1  +r⇤+ ⇤iii + ⇤ii
i
At 1.
Leading this expression forward by one day, and substituting in the definition for overnight returns
produces
Rt+1 = St+1:i + Pt+1   (1 + r)St:iv = 1 + r
r
Vt+1 + ⇤iAt,
as shown in (A.50a).
To find expressions for the intraday price changes, we first use (A.41c) to substitute for St:iii in
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the definition  St:iii = ⇤iiiAt 1 + St:iii   E[St:iii|It:ii]. This produces
 St:iii = ⇤iiiAt 1 + E [St:iv |It:iii]  E [St:iv |It:ii]
+   1iii|siv {E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii]} ,
= ⇤iiiAt 1   11  +r⇤(E[At|It:iii]  E[At|It:ii])
+   1iii|siv {E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii]} ,
as shown in (A.50b ). Equation (A.41c) also implies that
 St:iv =    1iii|sivE [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii] + St:iv   [St:iv |It:iii] ,
=    1iii|sivE [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii] + St:iv   [St:iv |It:iii]
    1iii|siv (E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii]) ,
= ⇤ivAt 1   11  +r⇤(At   E[At|It:iii])
    1iii|siv (E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii]) ,
as shown in (A.50c).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
There are two steps in the Proof: In step 1, I show that intraday price changes and overnight returns
follow (15) under the conjectured equilibrium process for aggregate inter-dealer order flows in (17).
In step 2 I verify that the optimal trading decisions of dealers and investors produce these order
flows.
Step One
Since aggregate order flows augment dealers’ common information at the start of rounds iii and iv
under the conjectured process for order flows in (17), dealers have common knowledge concerning Yt
when quoting round iii prices, and common knowledge concerning Ht when quoting round iv prices.
Consequently, At   E[At|It:iii] =  Ht and E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]   E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii] =
E [Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii] =  &Yt, for some unknown parameter &. Hence
 St:iv = ⇤ivAt 1 + 11  +r⇤Ht +  
 1
iii|siv&Yt,
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and so
E[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii] = ⇤ivAt 1 +   1iii|siv&Yt.
Overnight returns are Rt+1 = 1+rr Vt+1 + ⇤iAt, so
E[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii] = ⇤i (Yt +  At 1) .
Substituting these equations into (A.47b) gives
Ot:iii +Ot:i =
ˆ N
0
n
⇥niii|siv
⇣
⇤ivAt 1 +   1iii|siv&Yt
⌘
+⇥niii|R⇤i (Yt +  At 1)
o
dn At 1   Yt,
=
⇣
⇥iii|siv 
 1
iii|siv& +⇥iii|R⇤i   1
⌘
Yt +
 
⇥iii|siv⇤iv +⇥iii|R⇤i   1
 
At 1.
So  & = ⇥iii|siv  1iii|siv& +⇥iii|R⇤i   1. Solving for & gives & =
1 ⇥iii|R⇤i
1+⇥iii|siv 
 1
iii|siv
and hence
Ot:iii +Ot:i =  
 iii|siv⇤iv
 
Yt +
 
⇥iii|siv⇤iv +⇥iii|R⇤i   1
 
At 1.
Now from (A.50b)
 St:iii = ⇤iiiAt 1   11  +r⇤(E[At|It:iii]  E[At|It:ii])
+   1iii|siv {E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii]} ,
= ⇤iiiAt 1  
⇣
1
1  +r⇤+
1
 ⇤iv
⌘
Yt
as shown in (15c). Similarly, At   E[At|It:iii] =  Ht, so (A.50c) becomes
 St:iv = ⇤ivAt 1   11  +r⇤(At   E[At|It:iii])
    1iii|siv (E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii]) ,
= ⇤ivAt 1 + 1 ⇤ivYt +
1
1  +r⇤Ht
as shown in (15d). This completes our verification of (15).
Step Two
Now we verify that equilibrium order flows follow (17). To begin, consider the implications of (15)
for investors’ individual forecasts. Recall that individual investors estimate aggregate foreign income
in round i based on their own income is Y nt = Yt+ "nt , where Yt and "nt are i.i.d. mean zero random
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variables with variances,  2y and  2" , respectively. By the Projection Theorem, E[Yt|⌦nt:i] = Gni Y nt ,
with Gny =  
2
y
 2y+ 2"
. In the benchmark equilibrium, investors hold the entire stock of Forex overnight,
so At 1 = E[At 1|⌦nt:i]. Combining these results with (15c) and (15d), gives
E[ St:iii|⌦nt:i] = ⇤iiiAt 1  
⇣
1
1  +r⇤+
1
 ⇤iv
⌘
GnyY nt ,
E[ St:iv|⌦nt:i] = ⇤ivAt 1 + 1 ⇤ivGnyY nt , and
E[Rt+1|⌦nt:i] = ⇤i At 1 + ⇤iGnyY nt .
Substituting these forecasts in into (A.47a) gives the following expression for investors’ round-
iorders:
Ot:i =
ˆ 1
0
n
 ⇥ni|siii
⇣
1
1  +r⇤+
1
 ⇤iv
⌘
GnyY nt +⇥ni|siv 1 ⇤ivGnyY nt +⇥ni|r⇤iGnyY nt
o
dn  Yt
+
ˆ 1
0
n
⇥ni|siii⇤iiiAt 1 +⇥
n
i|siv⇤ivAt 1 +⇥
n
i|r⇤i At 1  At 1
o
dn,
=
hn
1
 ⇤iv(⇥i|siv  ⇥i|siii)  11  +r⇤⇥i|siii +⇥i|r⇤i
o
Gny   1
i
Yt
+
 
⇥i|siii⇤iii +⇥i|siv⇤iv +⇥i|r⇤i   1
 
At 1,
=  yi Yt +  
a
i At 1,
Next, consider the implications of (15) for dealers’ forecasts. In round i, each dealer receives
a random allocation of investors orders (because dealers quote the same round-i price), so Odt:i =
1
dOt:i + ⇣
d
t:i, with
Pd
d=1 ⇣
d
t:i = 0. Their best estimate of foreign income based on this order is
E[Yt|⌦dt:ii] = Gdy(Odt:i   E[Odt:i|Idt:i]) = Gdy( 1d yi Yt + ⇣dt:i), where Gdy =
1
d 
y
i  
2
y
( 1d 
y
i )
2 2y +  
2
⇣
.
Dealers’ individual forecasts in round ii are therefore
E[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii] = E[ St:iii|It:ii] 
⇣
1
1  +r⇤+
1
 ⇤iv
⌘
Gdy
⇣
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
and
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii] = E[ St:iv|It:ii] + 1 ⇤ivGdy
⇣
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
.
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Combining equations (22) and (21)gives
U [Xt:ii| It:ii] =
Xd
d=1
 dii|siii
n
E[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii]  E[ St:iii|It:ii]
o
+
Xd
d=1
 dii|siv
n
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii]  E[ St:iv|It:ii]
o
+ 1d
Xd
d=1
n
E[Xt:ii|⌦dt:ii]  E[Xt:ii|It:ii]
o
+Ot:i   E[Ot:i|It:ii].
So substituting in dealers’ forecasts
U [Xt:ii| It:ii] =  
Xd
d=1
 dii|siii
n⇣
1
1  +r⇤+
1
 ⇤iv
⌘
Gdy
⇣
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘o
+
Xd
d=1
 dii|siv
n
1
 ⇤ivGdy
⇣
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘o
+
Xd
d=1
1
d 
y
iiGdy
⇣
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
+  yi Yt,
=
nh
 ii|siv
1
 ⇤iv    ii|siii
⇣
1
1  +r⇤+
1
 ⇤iv
⌘
+  yii
i
1
dGdy + 1
o
 yi Yt,
=  yiiYt.
This verifies that round-ii order flow follows (17a) with
 yii =
 yi
1  1dGdy yi
n
1 +
h
 ii|siv
1
 ⇤iv    ii|siii
⇣
1
1  +r⇤+
1
 ⇤iv
⌘i
1
dGdy
o
.
Finally, to verify that round iii order flow follows (17b), we note that (15) implies
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii] = E[ St:iv|It:iii] + 11  +r⇤E[Ht|⌦dt:iii].
Each dealer receives a hedging order of Hdt = 1dHt + ⌘
d
t , with
Pd
d=1 ⌘
d
t = 0, so their estimate of the
Ht shock is
E[Ht|⌦dt:iii] = Gdh(Hdt   E[Hdt |Idt:iii]) = Gdh( 1dHt + ⌘dt ) where Gdh =
1
d 
2
h
( 1d)
2 2h +  
2
⌘
.
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We now combine this equation with ( 22) and (23) to give
U [Xt:iii| It:iii] =
Xd
d=1
 diii|siv
⇣
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii]  E[ St:iv|It:iii]
⌘
+ 1d
Xd
d=1
⇣
E
h
Xt:iii|⌦dt:iii
i
  E [Xt:iii|It:iii]
⌘
+ (Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i)  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii] ,
=
Xd
d=1
 diii|siv
1
1  +r⇤E[Ht|⌦dt:iii] +
Xd
d=1
1
d 
h
iiiE[Ht|⌦dt:iii] +Ht,
=
Xd
d=1
 diii|siv
1
1  +r⇤Gdh( 1dHt + ⌘dt ) +
Xd
d=1
1
d 
h
iiiGdh( 1dHt + ⌘dt ) +Ht,
=  iii|siv
1
1  +r⇤
1
dGdhHt +  hiiiGdh 1dHt +Ht,
=
n
 iii|siv
1
1  +r⇤
1
dGdh +  hiii 1dGdh + 1
o
Ht,
=  hiiiHt.
This verifies that round-iii order flow follows (23) with
 hiii =
1 + ⇤1  +r
1
dGdh iii|siv
1  1dGdh
.
⌅
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The Proof proceeds in four steps. In step one, I compute the conditional expectations and second
moments for individual investors given the conjectured behavior of equilibrium prices in (26) and
order flows in (28). Step two repeats these calculations for individual dealers. In step three, I verify
that the equilibrium order flows follow (28). In the last step, I verify that equilibrium prices follow
(26).
Before getting into the details, it is useful to rewrite equilibrium equations for  St:iii and  St:iv
in terms of the exogenous shocks:
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 St:iii = ⇤iiiAt 1 +  iii yiiYt +  iii 
h
iiHt,
= ⇤iiiAt 1 + ByiiYt + BhiiHt,
 St:iv = ⇤ivAt 1 +  iv1( 
y
iiiYt +  
h
iiiHt) +  iv2( 
y
iiYt +  
h
iiHt),
= ⇤ivAt 1 + ( iv1 
y
iii +  iv2 
y
ii)Yt + ( 
h
iii +  iv2 
h
ii)Ht,
= ⇤ivAt 1 + ByiiiYt + ByiiiHt.
Step One
Individual investors choose their round-i orders based on their conditional expectations for Yt and
Ht and their associated variances. As above, the conditional moments for Yt are
E[Yt|⌦nt:i] =
 2y
 2y +  
2
"
(Yt + "
n
t ) = GnyY nt , and V[Yt|⌦nt:i]= 2y  
 4y
 2y +  
2
"
= (1  Gny) 2y,
and those for Ht are E[Ht|⌦nt:i] = 0 and E[Ht|⌦nt:i]= 2h. On the basis of these estimates, investor n’s
private forecasts are
E[ St:iii|⌦nt:i] = ByiiGnyY nt + ⇤iiiAt 1,
E[ St:iv|⌦nt:i] = ByiiiGnyY nt + ⇤ivAt 1,
E[Rt+1|⌦nt:i] = ⇤i ( At 1 + GnyY nt ) .
In round iii, investors estimate Yt and Ht based on Y nt and round-ii order flow – which is derived
from their observation of prices and knowledge of At 1 as: U[Xt|It:ii] =   1iii ( St:iii   ⇤iiiAt 1).
Applying the Projection Theorem, we find that
E[Yt|⌦nt:iii] =
h
 2y  
y
ii 
2
y
i "  2y +  2"  yii 2y
 yii 
2
y ( 
y
ii)
2  2y + ( 
h
ii)
2  2h
# 1 "
Yt + "nt
U[Xt|It:ii]
#
= Kny|Y Y nt +Kny|XU[Xt|It:ii],
V[Yt|⌦nt:iii] =  2y  
h
 2y  
y
ii 
2
y
i "  2y +  2"  yii 2y
 yii 
2
y ( 
y
ii)
2  2y + ( 
h
ii)
2  2h
# 1 "
 2y
 yii 
2
y
#
,
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and
E[Ht|⌦nt:iii] =
⇥
 hii 
2
y
⇤ h
( yii)
2  2y + ( 
h
ii)
2  2h
i 1
U[Xt|It:ii] = Knh|XU[Xt|It:ii],
V[Ht|⌦nt:iii] =  2h  
⇥
 hii 
2
h
⇤ h
( yii)
2  2y + ( 
h
ii)
2  2h
i 1 ⇥
 hii 
2
h
⇤
=
⇣
1   hiiKnh|X
⌘
 2h.
The investor’s private round-iii forecasts are therefore
E[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii] = Byiii
⇣
Kny|Y Y nt +Kny|XU[Xt|It:ii]
⌘
+ BhiiiKnh|XU[Xt|It:ii] + ⇤ivAt 1,
E[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii] = ⇤i
⇣
Kny|Y Y nt +Kny|XU[Xt|It:ii]
⌘
  ⇤iKnh|XU[Xt|It:ii] + ⇤i At 1.
These forecasts are used to compute investors’ round-iii orders in Step Three.
Step Two
Individual dealers initiate their inter-dealer trades in round ii base on their private estimates of Yt
and Ht that are conditioned on the orders they receive from investors in round i and the hedgers in
round ii. These estimates are given by
E[Yt|⌦dt:ii] =
1
d 
y
i  
2
y
( 1d 
y
i )
2 2y +  
2
⇣
⇣
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
= Gdy
⇣
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
, and
E[Ht|⌦dt:ii] =
1
d 
2
h
( 1d)
2 2h +  
2
⌘
⇣
1
dHt + ⌘
d
t
⌘
= Gdh
⇣
1
dHt + ⌘
d
t
⌘
.
The dealer’s forecasts for  St:iii and  St:iv are therefore
E[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii]  E[ St:iii|It:ii] = ByiiGdy
⇣
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
+ BhiiGdh
⇣
1
dHt + ⌘
d
t
⌘
, and
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii]  E[ St:iv|It:ii] = ByiiiGdy
⇣
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
+ ByiiiGdh
⇣
1
dHt + ⌘
d
t
⌘
.
In round iii, each dealer revises their estimates of Yt and Ht to incorporate information in
round-ii order flow and the round-iii orders they receive from investors. The revised estimates are
E[Yt|⌦dt:iii] =
h
Kdy|Oi Kdy|Oiii Kdy|X
i264
1
d 
y
i Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
1
d 
y
iiiYt +
1
d 
x
iiiU[Xt|It:ii] + ⇣dt:iii
U[Xt|It:ii]
375 ,
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whereh
Kdy|Oi Kdy|Oiii Kdy|X
i
=
h
1
d 
y
i  
2
y  iii 
2
y  
y
ii 
2
y
i
⇥264
 
1
d 
y
i
 2
 2y +  
2
⇣
1
d 
y
i  iii 
2
y
1
d 
y
i  
y
ii 
2
y
1
d 
y
i  iii 
2
y  
2
iii 
2
y +
 
1
d 
x
iii 
h
ii
 2
 2h +  
2
⇣  iii 
y
ii 
2
y +
1
d 
x
iii ( 
h
ii)
2  2h
1
d 
y
i  
y
ii 
2
y  iii 
y
ii 
2
y +
1
d 
x
iii ( 
h
ii)
2  2h ( 
y
ii)
2  2y + ( 
h
ii)
2  2h
375
 1
with  iii = ( 1d 
y
iii +
1
d 
x
iii 
y
ii) and
E[Ht|⌦dt:iii] =
h
Kdh|H Kdh|X
i " 1
dHt + ⌘
d
t
U[Xt|It:ii]
#
,
where
h
Kdh|H Kdh|X
i
=
h
1
d 
2
H  
h
ii 
2
h
i "   1
d
 2
 2H +  
2
⌘
1
d 
h
ii 
2
h
1
d 
h
ii 
2
h ( 
y
ii)
2  2y + ( 
h
ii)
2  2h
# 1
.
The individual dealer’s forecast for  St:iv is computed from these estimates as
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii] = ByiiiE[Yt|⌦dt:iii] + BhiiiE[Ht|⌦dt:iii] + ⇤ivAt 1.
We also require forecasts based on dealers’ common information. The order flow equations in
(28) imply that"
Yt
Ht
#
=
"
 yii  
h
ii
 yiii  
h
iii
# 1 "
U[Xt|It:ii]
U[Xt|It:iii]
#
=
1
 yii 
h
iii  hii yiii
"
 hiii   hii
  yiii  yii
#"
U[Xt|It:ii]
U[Xt|It:iii]
#
.
(A.53)
Thus, values of Yt and Ht are common knowledge among dealers by the start of round iv: i.e.,
E[Yt|It:iv] = Yt and E[Ht|It:iv] = Ht. In round ii, the estimates of Yt and Ht are conditioned on
order flow from round ii:
E [Yt| It:iii] = Ky|XU[Xt|It:ii] and E [Ht| It:iii] = Kh|XU[Xt|It:ii]
where
Ky|X =  
y
ii 
2
y
( yii)
2  2y + ( 
h
ii)
2  2h
and Kh|X=  
h
ii 
2
h
( yii)
2  2y + ( 
h
ii)
2  2h
.
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In round ii the estimates of Yt andHt are equal to the unconditional expectations: i.e., E[Yt|It:ii] = 0
and E[Ht|It:ii] = 0. Below we use the diﬀerences between dealers’ individual and common estimates,
which are given by
E[Yt|⌦dt:iii]  E [Yt| It:iii] = Kdy|Oi( 1d yi Yt + ⇣dt:i) +Kdy|Oiii
⇣
1
d 
y
iiiYt + ⇣
d
t:iii
⌘
+
⇣
Kdy|X +Kdy|Oiii( 1d xiii) Ky|X
⌘
U[Xt|It:ii], and
E[Ht|⌦dt:iii]  E [Ht| It:iii] = Kdh|H( 1dHt + ⌘dt ) +
⇣
Kdh|X  Kh |X
⌘
U[Xt|It:ii].
From these results, we can compute the diﬀerence between dealers’ individual and common forecasts
as
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii]  E[ St:iv|It:iii] =
Byiii
⇣
Kdy|Oi( 1d yi Yt + ⇣dt:i) +Kdy|Oiii
⇣
1
d 
y
iiiYt + ⇣
d
t:iii
⌘⌘
+ BhiiiKdh|H( 1dHt + ⌘dt )
+
h
Byiii
⇣
Kdy|X +Kdy|Oiii( 1d xiii) Ky|X
⌘
+ Bhiii
⇣
Kdh|X  Kh |X
⌘i
U[Xt|It:ii]. (A.54)
Step Three
In this step, we compute unexpected aggregate order flows in rounds i and iii. For round i, we first
combine equations (22) and (21) to give
U [Xt:ii| It:ii] =
Xd
d=1
 dii|siii
n
E[ St:iii|⌦dt:ii]  E[ St:iii|It:ii]
o
+
Xd
d=1
 dii|siv
n
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:ii]  E[ St:iv|It:ii]
o
+ 1d
Xd
d=1
n
E[Xt:ii|⌦dt:ii]  E[Xt:ii|It:ii]
o
+U[Ot:i|It:ii]. (A.55)
The last term in this expression is the unexpected aggregate imbalance in investors’ round-i orders.
To find this term, we compute the round-i order from investor n:
Ont:i = ⇥ni|siiiE[ St:iii|⌦nt:i] +⇥ni|sivE[ St:iv|⌦nt:i] +⇥ni|rE[Rt+1|⌦nt:i] At 1   Y nt ,
=
nh
⇥ni|siiiByii +⇥ni|sivByiii +⇥ni|r⇤i
i
Gny   1
o
Y nt +
n
⇥ni|siii⇤iii +⇥
n
i|siv⇤iv +⇥
n
i|r⇤i   1
o
At 1,
=  yi Y
n
t +  
a
i At 1,
as shown in (27a). Aggregating across investors gives
Ot:i =  yi Yt +  ai At 1, (A.56)
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so the last term in (A.55), U[Ot:i|It:ii] =  yi Yt.
The other terms in (A.55) come from the dealers’ forecasts computed in Step Two:
U [Xt:ii| It:ii] =
Xd
d=1
 dii|siiiByiiGdy
⇣
( 1d 
y
i )Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
+
Xd
d=1
 dii|siiiBhiiGdh
⇣
1
dHt + ⌘
d
t
⌘
+
Xd
d=1
 dii|sivByiiiGdy
⇣
( 1d 
y
i )Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
+
Xd
d=1
 dii|sivBhiiiGdh
⇣
1
dHt + ⌘
d
t
⌘
+ 1d
Xd
d=1
 yiiGdy
⇣
( 1d 
y
i )Yt + ⇣
d
t:i
⌘
+ 1d
Xd
d=1
 hiiGdh
⇣
1
dHt + ⌘
d
t
⌘
+  yi Yt,
which simplifies to
U [Xt:ii| It:ii] =
h
 ii|siiiByiiGdy( 1d yi ) +  ii|sivByiiiGdy( 1d yi ) +  yiiGdy( 1d yi ) +  yi
i
Yt
+
h
 ii|siiiBhii( 1dGdh) +  ii|sivBhiii( 1dGdh) +  hii( 1dGdh)
i
Ht.
This is the form of the round-ii order flow equation (28a). Equating coeﬃcients on Yt and Ht gives
 yii =  ii|siiiByiiGdy( 1d yi ) +  ii|sivByiiiGdy( 1d yi ) +  yiiGdy( 1d yi ) +  yi , and (A.57a)
 hii =  ii|siiiBhii( 1dGdh) +  ii|sivBhiii( 1dGdh) +  hii( 1dGdh). (A.57b)
The equilibrium values of  yii and  hii must satisfy these equations.
Next, we turn to the round-iii flow. As above, (22) and (23) imply that
U [Xt:iii| It:iii] =
Xd
d=1
 diii|siv
⇣
E[ St:iv|⌦dt:iii]  E[ St:iv|It:iii]
⌘
+ 1d
Xd
d=1
⇣
E
h
Xt:iii|⌦dt:iii
i
  E [Xt:iii|It:iii]
⌘
+U [Ht| It:iii] + U [Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii] . (A.58)
The first term on the right-hand-side uses the diﬀerence between dealers’ private forecasts and their
common forecast for  St:iv, which was compute in (A.54). The next term is the analogous diﬀerence
in forecasts for order flow:
E[Xt:iii|⌦dt:iii]  E [Xt:iii|It:iii] =  yiii
⇣
E[Yt|⌦dt:iii]  E [Yt|It:iii]
⌘
+  hiii
⇣
E[Ht|⌦dt:iii]  E [Ht|It:iii]
⌘
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=  yiiiKdy|Oi( 1d yi Yt + ⇣dt:i) +  yiiiKdy|Oiii
⇣
1
d 
y
iiiYt + ⇣
d
t:iii
⌘
+  yiii
⇣
Kdy|X +Kdy|Oiii( 1d xiii) Ky|X
⌘
U[Xt|It:ii]
+  hiiiKdh|H( 1dHt + ⌘dt ) +  hiii
⇣
Kdh|X  Kh |X
⌘
U[Xt|It:ii],
=
h
 yiii
⇣
Kdy|X +Kdy|Oiii( 1d xiii) Ky|X
⌘
+  hiii
⇣
Kdh|X  Kh|X
⌘i
U[Xt|It:ii]
+ yiiiKdy|Oi( 1d yi Yt + ⇣dt:i) +  yiiiKdy|Oiii
⇣
1
d 
y
iiiYt + ⇣
d
t:iii
⌘
+  hiiiKdh|H( 1dHt + ⌘dt ).
The aggregate imbalance in hedgers’ orders is given by Ht = (1  )At 1+Ht, so the third term in
(A.55) is
U [Ht| It:iii] = U [Ht| It:iii] = Ht  Kh|XU[Xt|It:ii].
To find the last term, we consider the round-iii order from investor n:
Ont:iii = ⇥niii|sivE[ St:iv|⌦nt:iii] +⇥niii|RE[Rt+1|⌦nt:iii] Ont:i  At 1   Y nt ,
=
nh
⇥niii|sivByiii +⇥niii|R⇤i
i
Kny|Y    yi   1
o
Y nt
+
h
⇥niii|sivByiiiKny|X +⇥niii|sivBhiiiKnh|X +⇥niii|R⇤i
⇣
Kny|X  Knh|X
⌘i
U[Xt|It:ii]
+
h
⇥niii|siv⇤iv +⇥
n
iii|R⇤i    ai  1
i
At 1,
which is the same form as (27b). The last term in (A.58) is computed by aggregating investors
orders from rounds i and iii:
Ot:iii +Ot:i =
ˆ 1
0
(Ont:iii +Ont:i)dn,
=
n⇥
⇥iii|sivByiii +⇥iii|R⇤i
⇤Kny|Y   1oYt
+
h
⇥iii|sivByiiiKny|X +⇥iii|sivBhiiiKnh|X +⇥iii|R⇤i
⇣
Kny|X  Knh|X
⌘i
Ut:iiXt
+
⇥
⇥iii|siv⇤iv +⇥iii|R⇤i  1
⇤
At 1,
= ( yi +  
y
iii)Yt +  
x
iiiUt:iiXt + ( 
a
i +  
a
iii)At 1.
The unexpected portion of Ot:iii +Ot:i, based on dealer common round-iii information is therefore
U [Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii] = ( yi +  yiii)U [Yt| It:iii] = ( yi +  yiii)
 
Yt  Ky|XU[Xt|It:ii]
 
.
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Substituting all of these results into the order flow equation gives
U [Xt:iii| It:iii] =  iii|siv
h
Byiii
⇣
Kdy|X +Kdy|Oiii( 1d xiii) Ky|X
⌘
+ Bhiii
⇣
Kdh|X  Kh |X
⌘i
U[Xt|It:ii]
+  iii|sivByiii
⇣
Kdy|Oi( 1d yi ) +Kdy|Oiii
 
1
d 
y
iii
 ⌘
Yt +  iii|sivBhiiiKdh|H 1dHt
+
h
 yiii
⇣
Kdy|X +Kdy|Oiii( 1d xiii) Ky|X
⌘
+  hiii
⇣
Kdh|X  Kh|X
⌘i
U[Xt|It:ii]
+  yiii
h
Kdy|Oi( 1d yi ) +  yiiiKdy|Oiii
 
1
d 
y
iii
 i
Yt +  
h
iiiKdh|H 1dHt.
+Ht  Kh|XU[Xt|It:ii] + ( yi +  yiii)
 
Yt  Ky|XU[Xt|It:ii]
 
.
So collecting terms
U [Xt:iii| It:iii] = ⇡xU[Xt|It:ii] + ⇡yYt + ⇡HHt,
= (⇡x 
y
ii + ⇡y)Yt + (⇡x 
h
ii + ⇡H)Ht.
This is the form of equation (28b) with
 yiii = ⇡x 
y
ii + ⇡y, (A.59a)
 hiii = ⇡x 
h
ii + ⇡h, (A.59b)
⇡x =  iii|siv
h
Byiii
⇣
Kdy|X +Kdy|Oiii( 1d xiii) Ky|X
⌘
+ Bhiii
⇣
Kdh|X  Kh |X
⌘i
+
h
 yiii
⇣
Kdy|X +Kdy|Oiii( 1d xiii) Ky|X
⌘
+  hiii
⇣
Kdh|X  Kh|X
⌘i
 Kh|H   ( yi +  yiii)Ky|X , (A.59c)
⇡h =  iii|sivBhiiiKdh|H 1d +  hiii 1dKdh|H + 1, and (A.59d)
⇡y =  iii|sivByiii
⇣
Kdy|Oi( 1d yi ) +Kdy|Oiii
 
1
d 
y
iii
 ⌘
+  yiii
h
Kdy|Oi( 1d yi ) +  yiiiKdy|Oiii
 
1
d 
y
iii
 i
+ ( yi +  
y
iii). (A.59e)
As above, the equilibrium values of  yiii and  hiii must satisfy these equations.
Step Four
The final step in the Proof is to verify that  St:iii and  St:iv follow the processes in (26c) and
(26d). Equation (A.50b) gives the general equation for  St:iii. To use this equation, we compute
E[At|It:iii]  E[At|It:ii] = E[Yt  Ht|It:iii]  E[Yt  Ht|It:ii] =
 Ky|X  Kh|X U[Xt|It:ii], (A.60)
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and
E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:iii]  E [Ht +Ot:iii +Ot:i| It:ii]
= E [Ht + ( 
y
i +  
y
iii)Yt| It:iii] +  xiiiU[Xt|It:ii]  E [Ht + ( yi +  yiii)Yt| It:ii] ,
=
 Kh|X + ( yi +  yiii)Ky|X +  xiii U[Xt|It:ii]. (A.61)
Substituting these terms into (A.50b) gives
 St:iii = ⇤iiiAt 1   11  +r⇤
 Ky|X  Kh|X Ut:iiXt +   1iii|siv  Kh|X + ( yi +  yiii)Ky|X +  xiii U[Xt|It:ii].
This is the form of equation (26c) with
 iii =  
 1
iii|siv
 Kh|X + ( yi +  yiii)Ky|X +  xiii   11  +r⇤  Ky|X  Kh|X  .
Equation (A.50c) gives the general equation for  St:iv. To use this equation, I compute
U[At|It:iii] =
h
1  1
i " U[Yt|It:iii]
U[Ht|It:iii]
#
,
=
h
1  1
i "  yii  hii
 yiii  
h
iii
# 1 "
U[Xt|It:ii]
U[Xt|It:iii]
#
 
"
U[Xt|It:ii]
0
#!
,
=    
h
ii +  
y
ii
 yii 
h
iii  hii yiii
U[Xt|It:iii]. (A.62)
Substituting (A.62) and (A.61) into (A.50c) produces
 St:iv = ⇤ivAt 1+ 11  +r⇤
 hii +  
y
ii
 yii 
h
iii  hii yiii
U[Xt|It:iii]   1iii|siv
 Kh|X + ( yi +  yiii)Ky|X +  xiii U[Xt|It:ii].
This is the form of equation (26d) with
 iv1 =
1
1  +r⇤
 hii +  
y
ii
 yii 
h
iii  hii yiii
and  iv2 =    1iii|siv
 Kh|X + ( yi +  yiii)Ky|X +  xiii  .
⌅
A.21
